DISARMAMENT

United Nations
Regional Disarmament
Workshop for Africa
Lagos, Nigeria,
3-7 April 1989

African Security Perceptions and Requirements Including Related Regional Issues

Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme

United Nations

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United Nations   New York, 1990

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PROGRAMME OF THE WORKSHOP

Monday, 3 April

10:00 - 11:00 a.m. **OPENING CEREMONY**
Chairman: Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo
Senior Co-ordinator
UN Disarmament Fellowship
Training and Advisory
Services Programme

WELCOME ADDRESS
Mr. Yasushi Akashi
Under-Secretary-General
for Disarmament Affairs
United Nations

INAUGURAL ADDRESS
H.E. Major-General I. Nwachukwu
Minister for External Affairs
Nigeria

3:00 - 3:45 p.m. **LECTURE**
Security Perceptions and Requirements in the African Context
Speaker: Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo

Chairman: Professor G.O. Olusanya
Director-General
Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs
Lagos, Nigeria

4:00 - 4:45 p.m. **DISCUSSION**

Tuesday, 4 April

3:00 - 4:00 a.m. **LECTURE**
Nuclear-free-zone in Africa

Speaker: Ambassador Saad Alfaragi
Director , International
Economic Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egypt)

Chairman: Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo

4:15 - 5:15 p.m. **DISCUSSION**

Wednesday, 5 April

9:00 - 9:45 a.m. **LECTURE**
On-going concrete negotiations in the areas of disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament: African Perspectives

Speaker: Ambassador Azikiwe
Ambassador of Nigeria to the
United Nations and Conference
Disarmament in Geneva

Chairman: Major-General J.N. Garba
Ambassador and Permanent
Representative of Nigeria to
the United Nations, New York

11:45 - 12:30 p.m. **DISCUSSION**

3:00 - 4:00 p.m. **LECTURE**
Disarmament and development with special reference to Africa

Speaker: Ambassador Koffi Adjoyi
Ambassador of Togo the the
United Nations in New York

Chairman: Ambassador B.A. Adeyemi
Acting Deputy Director General
International Organizations
Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nigeria

Thursday, 6 April

9:00 - 10:00 a.m. **LECTURE**
Western perspectives on the maintenance of Security in Europe

Speaker: Dr. Jimi Peters
Senior Research Fellow
Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs

10:00 - 10:45 a.m. **DISCUSSION**

10:45 - 11:30 a.m. **LECTURE**
East/West Experience in the Search for Security (from Helsinki to Stockholm and to Vienna)
Speaker: Mr. K. Yuriy Deriabin
Chief
Department for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, USSR

Chairman: Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo

11:45 - 12:30 p.m. **DISCUSSION**

3:00 - 3:30 p.m. **LECTURE**
African States, Reducing Tensions and Achieving Security in the South Atlantic
Speaker: Dr. Sam Chime
Director of Research
National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
Kuru, Nigeria

Chairman: Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo

3:45 - 4:30 p.m. **DISCUSSION**

4:30 - 5:00 p.m. **LECTURE**
Regional Peace-Keeping in Africa
Speaker: Ambassador Mamadou Bah
Director of Political Department
Organization of African Unity

Chairman: Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo

5:15 - 6:00 p.m.	DISCUSSION

Friday, 7 April

9:00 - 9:45 a.m.	**LECTURE** **Conventional Disarmament and its Effect on Africa** Speaker: Ambassador Olu Adeniji Ambassador of Nigeria to France Chairman: Professor G.O. Olusanya
10:00 - 10:45 a.m.	**DISCUSSION**
3:00 - 4:00 p.m.	**EVALUATION** **Lessons Learned** Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo
4:00 - 5:00 p.m.	**CLOSING STATEMENTS AND AWARD OF CERTIFICATES**
4:30 - 5:00 p.m.	Statement by Ambassador Mamman Anka Honourable Minister of State
4:05 - 4:10 p.m.	Statement by Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo
4:10 - 4:30 p.m.	Award of Certificats to participants by Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo

ADDRESS OF WELCOME
by
Yasushi Akashi
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs

Honourable Minister for External Affairs, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you all to the 1989 United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Africa.

Allcw me, first of all, to express my deep appreciation to the Government of Nigeria for the generous offer to host this Workshop. It is yet another expression of Nigeria's steadfast support for the United Nations and of its keen interest in disarmament and security. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs feels especially privileged that H.E. Major-General Nwachukwu, the Minister for External Affairs, has graciously consented to deliver the inaugural address.

Nigeria has played a prominent role in disarmament negotiations as well as in disarmament education. Since the early 1960s when Nigeria first joined the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, prominent Nigerian diplomats have left their mark on the multilateral negotiating forum. As far as disarmament education is concerned, Nigeria was the moving force behind the establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme in 1978 by the UN General Assembly at its First Special Session on Disarmament. This programme, which celebrated its tenth anniversary last year, has trained over 200 government officials from about 100 UN Member States. UN Member States have appreciated the initiative of Nigeria, and have on many occasions emphasized the importance and value of the programme in promoting greater expertise in an ever-expanding number of Member States to deal with highly complex disarmament and security issues. It is pertinent to recall that the then Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Ambassador Major-General J. Garba, first made Nigeria's proposal to establish the programme in the general debate at the First Special Session on Disarmament and Ambassador Adeniji pursued the matter in the Committee of the Whole until it was finally adopted.

This Workshop programme was established in 1985 by the General Assembly at the initiative of Nigeria. The primary objective of these Workshops is to provide assistance to the Governments of the regions concerned, through the organization of workshops annually at the regional or subregional level, in co-operation with the governments and intergovernmental organizations concerned, for the benefit of government officials, who are concerned with arms limitation and disarmament measures, as well as to promote a better understanding and awareness in the region of the international and regional machinery for the promotion of disarmament efforts and regional security. In effect, the Disarmament Fellowship Programme, which is global in scope, and the Regional Disarmament Workshop, which is regional in scope, complement each other.

We gather here at a time of some very encouraging developments in international relations:

(a) the entry into force of the intermediate-range nuclear forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union;

(b) their commitment to reduce by 50 per cent their strategic nuclear arms;

(c) the decision of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) to enter a new stage of negotiation on conventional disarmament in Europe, have all given important impetus to the disarmament process.

There has been significant overall improvement in East-West relations and in the global political and security climate. In many parts of the world, efforts have begun to end military conflicts or reduce tensions. The recent developments in Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, Angola, Namibia, Western Sahara and Kampuchea are encouraging. We have reason to be hopeful with regard to steps to be taken concerning other conflicts. In short, a new, positive wind is blowing around the world; and the constructive role played by the United Nations is particularly noticeable to all and comforting to us working in the universal body.

In contrast to the situation which prevailed in the late 1970s and much of the 1980s, these recent developments have led some observers to state that the world is now at a turning point for a more peaceful phase. This may prove to be true, provided that current momentum towards peace is maintained, consolidated and even carried forward.

Progress in the area of disarmament and arms limitation will not only be a clear sign that we are moving towards such a new phase of international affairs, but also will be an indispensable element in fostering more stable relations between States based on a shared perception of challenges faced by all.

I believe that there is wide agreement that efforts in pursuit of disarmament at all levels – bilateral, regional and subregional, and global – should complement and mutually reinforce one another. Advance at each level should contribute to the overall enhancement of security for everyone. The major task before the international community is to find the ways and means to facilitate progress at all levels.

The framers of the UN Charter envisaged a collaborative relationship between the universal structure for collective security *and* regional agencies and arrangements, as can be seen from Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The regional, and even subregional, approach is increasingly perceived as offering an appropriate and practical framework for achieving positive results, in view of the geopolitical, historical, cultural and other concerns of the States in a particular region or subregion.

The UN Secretary-General has emphasized the importance of the regional and subregional dimensions of peace and security as follows: "The regional dimension of disarmament merits much attention since it is in regional conflicts that weapons are actually being used for purposes of war. The acquisition of large quantities of sophisticated arms by developing countries places a severe strain on badly needed resources while adding nothing to the strength of their economies. Furthermore, it adds to the external debt and creates a secondary demand for imports that increases their dependence. Improved regional security arrangements could reduce the need felt by them for expensive arms and large armed forces."

Within the African context, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) offers a unique instrument for the promotion of regional security as well as efforts to resolve local or regional conflicts. Just to illustrate, in 1964, the OAU adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, expressing the collective will of African countries to contribute to disarmament in general and to nuclear disarmament in particular. The OAU has also dealt with other issues such as disarmament and nuclear tests; the interrelationship between security, development and disarmament; the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development; the Lomé Declaration and Programme of

Action; the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament; the dumping of nuclear and industrial waste in Africa; the proposal for the establishment of an OAU Political Security Council; and the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

In a region as vast and as complex as Africa, with its rich diversity, the subregional approach may often be a suitable initial action. As a matter of fact, a number of organizations aimed at subregional co-operation have flourished in Africa. Clearly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) stands as a fine example of arrangements made at the subregional level. Although principally dedicated to economic progress, ECOWAS, with headquarters in Nigeria, has developed a concern for security issues as well. We noted with keen attention the recognition by Heads of State and Government of the Community, of the interrelationship between peace, security and development. It is in this respect that we welcomed the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence Matters of ECOWAS as instruments for the realization of the Community's objectives. The final communiqué adopted at the Tenth Summit of ECOWAS held at Abuja, Nigeria, in July 1987, appealed to Member States to translate into concrete action the Community's Protocol on Non-Aggression.

The United Nations has long supported the search for security at the lowest possible level of armaments. Our discussion during this Workshop should focus on issues that have a direct bearing on the conditions and prospects for peace and security in the African region - a region whose importance was recognized by the United Nations in innumerable instances and, more particularly, by the activities of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, located in Lomé, Togo.

As you see from the programme of the Workshop, the topics of the Workshop revolve around the theme "African security and other related issues". Areas which will be examined in the next few days include: security perceptions and requirements in the African context; regional systems for the promotion of security and conflict resolution in Africa; nuclear-free zone in Africa; disarmament and development with special reference to Africa; African States and reducing tensions and achieving security in the South Atlantic; African States and security in the Indian Ocean; regional peace-keeping in Africa; conventional disarmament and its effect on Africa; multilateral system for the promotion of security and disarmament; East/West experience in the search for security (from Helsinki through Stockholm to Vienna).

It is my hope that the interaction among the participants coming from all parts of Africa will provide a unique opportunity for the forging of co-operation and trust which will extend beyond the duration of the Workshop.

It gives me particular pleasure to welcome the distinguished group of speakers who have accepted our invitation to this Workshop. I am sure that they will greatly contribute, with their knowledge and insight in their various areas of expertise, to making the Workshop a worthwhile experience for all of us.

My appreciation goes equally to the distinguished experts who have agreed to chair some of the sessions of the Workshop.

My gratitude goes also to Norway, represented here by Ambassador Svein Saether, which has made a substantial financial contribution to the 1989 United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Africa.

It is not for me to anticipate what our speakers are going to say. But I am convinced that, with their vast knowledge and experience, the Workshop will provide a unique opportunity for meaningful and constructive discussions. I am equally sure that it will be a forum for exchanging views, finding new ideas, and addressing global peace and disarmament issues as well as problems of particular relevance to Africa. I now declare the Workshop open.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS
by
Major General Ike Nwachukwu
Minister for External Affairs
Lagos, Nigeria

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the commencement of the United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Africa. As you are all aware, its objective is to deepen the understanding of disarmament matters among countries in the African region and thus help to enhance prospects for peace and security not only on our continent but in the world as a whole.

First, I would like to thank the co-sponsors of this Workshop, in this case, the United Nations, which has remained in the vanguard for the quest for world peace and international security. Secondly, to pay tribute to the political and material support which the Government of Norway and other Nordic countries have consistently and generously given to the cause of disarmament world-wide. Thirdly, the Federal Military Government for providing the venue for the first Regional Disarmament Workshop. This gesture shows our abiding faith in the principles and purposes that informed the Charter of the United Nations and is clearly demonstrative of our determination to support disarmament measures in all their facets in furtherance of world peace.

Historically, the strongest impetus for peace is usually borne out of a devastated world. As with the League of Nations before it, the United Nations too arose from the ashes of a world war – the Second World War, which witnessed the death of millions and unprecedented destruction. Consequently, the founding fathers of the United Nations, at the San Francisco Conference in the summer of 1945, pledged solemnly to save "succeeding generations from the scourge of war". In drawing up the United Nations Charter, therefore, they also embodied principles which provide for the foundation of a forum to discourage war as an instrument of policy between nations.

Since then, the United Nations has dealt with increasingly complex issues concerning arms limitation and disarmament, and continues to play a central role in this field.

Disarmament is broadly understood as the process of reducing the size of, and expenditures on armed forces, destroying and dismantling weapons, whether deployed or stockpiled, progressively eliminating the capacity to produce new weapons and releasing and integrating military personnel into civilian life. No disarmament measure can be durable unless the process itself is implemented through balanced and equitable reductions and provides mutually acceptable methods of verification and compliance to ensure undiminished security for all States at all stages. That will not be all. Perhaps, just as important in this process for arms limitation agreements, nations must strive sincerely and genuinely to set credible limits in the quantitative growth and qualitative refinement of their military arsenals, be they conventional or nuclear. Only in this manner can we make substantial progress towards mutual confidence-building, without which, the momentum towards actual reductions in arms and armed forces would be gravely reversed if not completely lost. It is instructive to note that Nigeria initiated the establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme in 1978 during the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. And it came in the wake of global concern for an unprecedented arms race and the attendant global military expenditure which then stood at about $US 650 billion a year. In the last decade, world expenditures for military purposes have indeed exceeded the $US 900 billion mark per year, and may well have touched the US$ trillion mark today. While the international political environment has somewhat improved as evident in the increasing *rapprochement* between the two major super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, culminating in the significant agreement for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF Treaty), the global armament situation is yet to stabilize.

It is in this context that the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme and the attendant offshoots of Regional Workshops can best be appreciated. The Fellowship Programme has immensely helped in establishing a sizeable corps of government officials from as many as 94 countries who are expected to boost disarmament measures and programmes in their respective countries. I believe that it is in furtherance of this noble objective that most of you are gathered here in the very first Regional Workshop devoted to disarmament studies.

I have observed that the programme before you covers a wide range of subject-matter such as: security perception and requirements within the context of Africa, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on our continent, and the vital question of the acknowledged linkage between disarmament and development, particularly within the context of Africa's economic growth and development.

The global military expenditure is a needless waste of resources that could be better utilized for development. Currently, there is a serious crisis in agriculture in Africa. There is the need to invest in water resources in order to enhance our agricultural output in Africa. One major problem that confronts agriculture in Africa is drought. If we can achieve a constant water supply for our agriculture, it will enable us to transform the continent into a bread-basket and thereby attain food security. If a tenth, only a fraction of the resources expended on armaments, were directed to agriculture, it would be sufficient to irrigate, fertilize the land and cope with the problem of starvation in Africa.

I feel hopeful that the Workshop will also help to illuminate new concepts in national defence postures, as for example, the welcome trend in international relations whereby nations are moving away more and more from the military doctrine of offensive defence to one of defensive defence. The growing recognition that both overarmament and underdevelopment constitute threats to international peace and security remains a compelling factor for the vigorous pursuit of undiminished security at lower levels of armament. Resources now needlessly wasted on arms could then be put to better use in addressing the superior needs in the economic, social and humanitarian sectors of society, thus contributing to overall security. Undoubtedly, these and other issues will be the focus of your discussion in this present Workshop. I do hope that the conclusions you will reach will herald a new phase of enlarging and broadening perceptions in the field of disarmament for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

The INF Treaty, which I mentioned earlier on, the successful conclusion in 1987 of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, the positive results in the same year of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the reduction of tension world-wide from the Gulf through Afghanistan to Kampuchea, as well as the recent opening for a peace settlement in the Middle East, and from Angola to Namibia — all these are positive trends in the international scene that should boost the momentum for world disarmament. But, they also portend new realities from which the African continent should draw the appropriate lessons. We must look at these events as a welcome opportunity to evolve our own home-grown formula for a gradual reduction in respect of military expenditures of our countries to facilitate the optimum utilization of scarce resources which are needlessly dissipated on overamament.

Behind the totality of these pertinent observations, one comes inevitably to an irrefutable conclusion. It is that general and complete disarmament will only be attained if: there exists the political will among the negotiators to reach agreement on arms limitation and control; nations move steadily and irreversibly away from the military doctrine of offensive defence and embrace the more stabilising doctrine of defensive defence; confidence-building measures are reinforced by mutual advance notices of troop movements and military manoeuvres; and, lines of communications are maintained among nations to facilitate quicker consultations for the purpose of defusing potential crises at source before they are allowed to degenerate into outright military confrontations.

The road to agreement on arms limitation and disarmament, given the scale of conditions that must be complied with, is certainly not as wide or open or even direct as a four-lane highway. Rather, it is more plausible to describe it as a narrow, winding and difficult path that eventually leads to the mountain top. Though tough and slippery, it is the beautiful view of the surrounding landscape that gives one the soothing feeling of relief and satisfaction, that very transcendent feeling known to envelop disarmament experts after agonizing sessions of arms control negotiations.

I am optimistic that this Workshop will give you all a deeper understanding of disarmament matters and a more profound appreciation of the central role of the United Nations in achieving this noble objective. It is my fervent hope that your deliberations this week will have set the stage for the irreversible march to general and complete disarmament. The skills that you will undoubtedly acquire should help in steering our planet farther and farther away from the path of war and destruction, to that of growth, development, prosperity, international peace and security.

SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

by

Sola Ogunbanwo

Senior Co-ordinator, UN Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services Programme

Introduction and Definition of Security in the African Context

Any discussion of security willl have to start by taking account of the personal security which is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Only then can we address national, regional and international security. In the study conducted by the United Nations Secretary-General with the help of governmental experts, it is stated that security "concerns important and sensitive political issues. The perspectives differ. Even the most basic definitions and perceptions may be subject to controversy. Nevertheless, the need to discuss these issues is real if mutual trust, respect and understanding are to be enhanced. This discussion should take place on the broadest possible basis. No nation should withdraw from this challenge, but contribute to efforts that seek to identify the common ground between nations". 1/

The primary function of any State is the promotion of its security in order to ensure the survival of its core values. The right to security by all States is recognized by the UN Charter, regardless of size, geographic location, social system, political or ideological belief, or level of development. The condition imposed is that the right to security by all States should be exercised at lower levels of armaments. Thus in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations". In Article 26 of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Security Council is to maintain

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1/ Study by the UN Secretary-General on "Concepts of Security", United Nations Study Series No. 14, para. 12, 1986.

international peace and security with the "least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources".

That is the definition of security which is of paramount concern to all States. In the traditional and narrow sense, security is defined in political and military terms. In the African context however, security is more than military security or security from external attacks. For many of the 4 billion inhabitants in the developing countries, security is conceived as the basic level of the struggle for survival. Eight hundred million live in absolute poverty and deprivation. Five hundred million are malnourished. Many millions have no access to safe drinking water and do not have the necessary income to purchase food. They lack protection against the consequences of environmental degradation and natural calamities, such as floods and drought, which, in Africa in particular, have produced famine and suffering of unprecedented proportions. Therefore, in order to provide an integrated African security assessment, the non-military dimensions of security should be added. Henceforth, African security as a concept should be applied in its broadest sense to include economic security, social security, environmental security, food security, the quality of life security, and technological security.

Factors Shaping African Security Perceptions

Africa's security concerns are various and complex. Factors which shape them can be said to include the preservation of existing borders of States, respect for their sovereignty, non-interference in their internal affairs, preservation of their inalienable right to independent existence, inter-State disputes, intercommunal distrust, domestic threats to security (e.g. civil wars, secessionist movements, etc.), perceived threats to security posed by South Africa's nuclear capability including the practice of *apartheid*, and non-military threats to security.

In article 2 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, African States undertake to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State. Notwithstanding this provision of the OAU Charter, the early years of the OAU were occupied by efforts to settle claims and counter-claims arising from border disputes. African States should respect the post-colonial borders as required by the OAU Charter.

Intercommunal distrust was a legacy from colonial régimes which arbitrarily grouped peoples together under the same administrative control. After independence, tensions often arise among the different groups, which result in intercommunal distrust. African States should adopt domestic policies which promote internal cohesion and political stability.

Another factor which shapes African security concerns is the total dependence of African countries on an external supply of technology, as well as arms required by individual countries or for regional joint action. The importation of technology and arms represents a major drain on African foreign exchange. This in turn affects how the available resources are distributed between the competing requirements for security and for economic and social development.

The patterns of regional security perceptions and concerns vary from region to region. However, security in any one region can hardly proceed in disregard of developments in other regions as well as in the world environment. Therefore, the various approaches for resolving African security concerns should be viewed from both the global viewpoint and the regional angle. Some of the approaches for resolving African security concerns can be grouped into the following headings: disarmament, nuclear-free Africa, conflict resolution, collective security, confidence-building measures, African security, development and disarmament, and the participation of African States in global forums for promoting security.

Disarmament Promotes African Security

In earlier times, the use of the word "disarmament" often provoked negative reactions from certain quarters in the African countries. This negative reaction might have something to do with the confusion surrounding the definition of disarmament. In the English language the prefix "dis" (as in *dis*armament) implies total absence of something. Those who used to have a negative attitude believed that disarmament meant the total absence of arms. Even in certain quarters of the developed countries, meticulous care has been taken to avoid the use of the word "disarmament"; instead, such words as "reduction of armaments", "arms limitation", "regulation of armaments", "arms control", etc. are being used. This unsatisfactory situation led Alva Myrdal to point out that the concept of disarmament should be extricated from the "terminological jungle" which has grown up around it, particularly since the introduction of the term "arms control". A quick reference to the United Nations Charter shows that disarmament is not meant to denote the total absence of arms. This is because the system of peace-keeping and enforcement measures envisaged by the Charter is predicated on the continued existence of national armed forces, which are to be made available to the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security, and which may be used for self-defence in the case of armed attack against a United Nations Member State until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures.

The negative reaction of developing countries to the word "disarmament" generally disappears when words such as "peace", "security", "human survival", "development" are used to define " disarmament". Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that disarmament is an objective and it involves a process which determines how the objective is to be achieved. The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD I) consolidated the modern approach to the definition of disarmament. Based on the Final Document, disarmament embraces not only concrete steps such as the reduction of arsenals of nuclear or conventional weapons and of the armed forces of States, but also collateral measures such as nuclear non-proliferation, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, confidence-building measures aimed at increasing trust among States, efforts to emphasize the economic and social consequences of the arms race, the linkage between disarmament and development, measures to mobilize public opinion to the dangers of the arms race, and the strengthening of the machinery of the United Nations to enable it to assume its primary role in disarmament.

Once the definition of disarmament is properly understood, the clear preference of Africa is the path of disarmament as an instrument of foreign policy for the promotion of African security. Indications of this can be deduced from African disarmament practices.

In the first instance, it should be recalled that Africa's initiation into the security and disarmament debate was in connection with France's nuclear tests in the Sahara in 1960. African States loudly protested against any further nuclear tests in the Sahara. This action was taken long before the expert study on the climatic effects of nuclear exchange between the nuclear Powers was carried out. Africa need not be the centre of a nuclear war; a nuclear winter which will affect the ecosystem and destroy organisms will have a most devastating effect on Africa, which is the region least equipped to cope with major disasters. Being quite dependent on other regions to deal with natural periodic disasters of drought and desertification, the unleashing of nuclear winter globally would cut off potential areas of assistance, leaving Africa to cope as best as it could with the aftermath.

Apart from taking a strong stand against nuclear tests, African States have taken other disarmament initiatives including: *(a)* adoption of resolutions declaring Africa a nuclear free zone; *(b)* adopting a resolution emphasizing the triangular linkage between security, development and disarmament; *(c)* adoption of a resolution on the setting up of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa; *(d)* African Document, reflecting the points of view of the African States concerning the relation between disarmament and development, adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee of 14 African States; *(e)* adoption of resolutions on the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament; *(f)* adoption of a resolution on dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; *(g)* adoption of resolutions on the proposals for the establishment of an African political security council; and *(i)* adoption of a decision on the principle of an African defence force.

All the above-mentioned African disarmament initiatives are based on the realization that African security can be achieved by adopting the collective approach, and that disarmament is realistic and compatible with the notion of African security.

African nuclear arms remain the most spectacular aspect of the arms race because they pose threats to the very existence of mankind, the complementary race in conventional arms has a more direct and proven impact on the developing countries (including Africa) – where the destructiveness of conventional arms has been demonstrated in more than 150 wars fought in 70 countries and accounting for 20 million casualties. While recognizing the regional dimensions of disarmament, the global process will have to take the lead in achieving disarmament measures. Africa will have to be part of a planned global disarmament process. This is one of the reasons why African States supported the Washington Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF Treaty), which created high hopes in the world. Through the INF Treaty, nuclear- weapon systems will be dismantled and destroyed under effective verification procedures. The fact that the INF Treaty relates to only 4% of the super-Powers' nuclear arsenals is the more reason why further measures must be continued and expanded.

In this connection, African States have welcomed the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE talks), which started in March 1989. The military conversion exercise that will follow conventional disarmament in Europe will release some resources from the military to the civilian sector, and stimulate the global economy, making available to Africa the much needed foreign component for its economic redemption.

Finally, it is in the interest of African States to continue to pursue the disarmament option for promoting peace and security in Africa, to take part in the global disarmament process, to establish confidence-building measures and to engage in enhanced regional institution-building.

Nuclear-Free Zone and African Security

The concept of a nuclear-free zone which began originally as an arrangement applied to uninhabited areas (e.g. the Antarctic Treaty of 1959), have now gained popularity as one which can be applied to populated areas as well, e.g., the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) of 1967 and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) of 1986. Nuclear-free zones have been declared or proposed for other regions, e.g., Africa, Central Europe, Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, South Asia and the Middle East.

Certain guidelines are applicable for the establishment of nuclear-free zones. They include: *(a)* the peculiarities of the countries in the zone concerned, i.e., the particular geographical, historical, economic, social and political conditions of the region concerned; *(b)* the source of threats faced by the region, i.e., whether the threat comes from within or from outside; *(c)* the nature of relations which exist between the countries of the region; *(d)* the guarantee by extra-regional Powers to respect the agreements to declare regional nuclear- free zones.

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It could be said that four elements gave rise to the concept of an African nuclear- free zone: First, in the nuclear age, and in line with the non-aligned policy adopted at independence, African States are usually opposed to the development of nuclear weapons. The objective of African States is principally how best to secure themselves in a nuclear age. Second, the belief that the concept of nuclear- free zone is a major component of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The objective is to discourage States from acquiring nuclear weapons which will endanger international peace and security. In this connection, it should be pointed out that forty out of fifty- two African States have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), thereby denying themselves the nuclear option. Third, a nuclear- free zone in Africa is intended as a confidence- building measure for the African States themselves as well as for any member of the international community which may not have nuclear weapons or the capability for producing nuclear weapons. Fourth, South Africa's nuclear capability appears to be a factor compelling African States to seek a denuclearization programme for the African continent.

Africa was declared a denuclearized zone by an OAU resolution in 1964, which has since been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa called on all States not to test, manufacture or store nuclear weapons in the African continent. The OAU also announced its readiness to undertake in an international treaty, to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, the obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.

The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa is now 25 years old. The time has come to pursue its implementation beyond the declaration stage to that of a legally binding treaty. The idea of the need for an early establishment of such a zone was confirmed in a statement of the former chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe. President Mugabe believed that the task of turning Africa into a nuclear-free zone should be given immediate priority. The transformation of the Declaration into treaty form will be a significant measure aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and will strengthen African security as well as reduce the risk of armed conflicts in Africa. It has often been said that South Africa's nuclear capability is an obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration. However, the transformation of the Declaration into treaty form should not be held hostage to the perceived threat from South Africa's nuclear capability. In order to allay fears, the proposed treaty should have a protocol whereby the nuclear-weapon States will guarantee African States party to the treaty security from attack with nuclear weapons either from within or outside the continent. This will hinder any perceived threat of attack by South Africa. Furthermore, South Africa should be made to sign the NPT, and its nuclear facilities should be monitored by the United Nations and the IAEA. The NPT should also be signed by those African States which have not yet done so. This will be their contribution to attaining the goal of a nuclear- free Africa.

The proposed treaty on a nuclear-free Africa could be prepared, taking into account the following documents and ideas: the provisions of the 1964 Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa; Document CM/3 containing a draft convention for the denuclearization of the continent of Africa, submitted by the OAU Secretariat during the second ordinary session of the Council of Ministers, held in Lagos from 24 to 29 February 1964; paragraph 10 of UN General Assembly resolution 43/71 B, which reads as follows: "requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa"; like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the treaty should have a *protocol* whereby the nuclear- weapon States will guarantee African States party to the treaty security from attack with nuclear weapons either from within or outside the continent; the treaty should provide for joint African efforts to explore the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or through the IAEA; the treaty should have verification procedures ensuring that the terms of the treaty are being complied with. The verification process should utilize the expertise of the IAEA; there should be an obligation not to allow the stationing or storage of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the zone; the declaration on the purposes and objectives of the OAU activities adopted on May 25, 1988 by the OAU Summit during the OAU's twenty-five year jubilee; the joint document which reflected the common African stand at the third special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament; comprehensive study of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects (by the CD in 1975); Final Document of SSOD I of 1978 (paragraphs 33 of the Declaration and paragraphs 61 and 62 of its Programme of Action); the lessons learned from the relevant provisions of the following treaties e.g., the Treaty of Tlateloco, the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Sea-Bed Treaty of 1971, the 1963 Partial Test- Ban Treaty, and the NPT.

Confidence-Building Measures in the African Context (CBMs)

The American historian, Barbara Tuchman, once said that "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they arm because they mistrust each other". Efforts should be made to remove mistrust and suspicion. The ultimate aim of confidence-building measures must be to strengthen peace and security in Africa, and to contribute to the development of confidence, better understanding and more stable relations between African States, thus creating and improving the conditions for unity and co-operation among African States.

African security is largely dependent on the application of confidence-building measures which include: *(a)* Measures to prevent and reduce local and regional conflicts, as well as those to reduce the necessity for competition in arms acquisition. For example, notwithstanding the provisions of the OAU Charter, African border conflicts persist. One way of building confidence may be through a "declaration by African States of acceptance of post-independence existing borders and renunciation of cross-border claims". Such a reciprocal declaration would promote good neighbourliness and eliminate inter-African arms competition; *(b)* Measures relating to transparency in inter-African affairs. This can be accomplished through mutual notification of troop movements, and the maintenance of communication lines; *(c)* There are enormous potentials for using the OAU to promote a united approach to the cause of threats to peace and security in Africa. Such potentials should be tested and exploited to the fullest. Furthermore, CBMs in the African context are suitable for the subregional approach. In this connection, by fostering economic trade and security links, ECOWAS has contributed to the development of CBMs in the West African context. There is a need to establish more African CBMs at the subregional level; *(d)* Measures requiring more personal contact between African Heads of State and Government, as well as between African officials. This will lead to an increase in knowledge of and familiarity with each other. This includes greater interaction between African countries within the same subregion, at the governmental and non-governmental levels. This action is intended to be complementary to the interactions during meetings of the OAU, ECOWAS and Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC).

In establishing CBMs for Africa, African States should take into account the lessons learned from the experience of Europe (from Helsinki to Stockholm and to Vienna), as well as the guidelines for CBMs established by the United Nations through the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Common Security for Africa

As has been noted earlier, African security cannot be discussed in a vacuum; it must be seen from both the global viewpoint and the regional angle.

At the forefront of the multilateral system for the promotion of global security is the United Nations. The essence of the United Nations as a security arrangement can be found in the Security Council machinery. The Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. However, the potentials of the United Nations for peace-making have not been fully exploited. This situation led the United Nations Secretary-General to declare in his 1989 report on the work of the Organization that "the United Nations has often been kept in a waiting position". As if to underscore this point, the United States and the Soviet Union were obligated to submit a joint draft resolution to the 44th session of the General Assembly in 1989 entitled "Enhancing international peace, security and international co-operation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

In its three operative paragraphs, the USA and USSR draft: *(a)* calls upon all States to intensify their practical efforts towards ensuring international peace and security in all its aspects through co-operative means in accordance with the Charter; *(b)* reaffirms support for the validity and relevance of the Charter and urges all States to abide by it and in particular to respect the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of States, and non-intervention in internal affairs; to refrain from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the Charter; peacefully to settle disputes; to adhere to the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, co-operation among States; and to comply in good faith with their obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter; *(c)* encourages member States to consult and co-operate within the framework of the United Nations, the Security Council, the General Assembly and their appropriate subsidiary bodies, in order to find multifaceted approaches to implement and strengthen the principles and system of peace, security and international co-operation laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

Commenting on the joint draft resolution, United States Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton stated that the purpose of the resolution was to reinforce support for the UN Charter and to call on all Member States to return to the original intent of the drafters of the Charter. For his part, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky stated that the UN Charter is still a sleeping beauty, and now we will be able to awaken it.

One of the ways for the United Nations to ensure the security of the developing coutries, including African countries, lies in the "collective security" system as contained in the UN Charter. But that system needs to be strengthened and made fully functional if it is to provide an effective security umbrella for the developing countries. The developing countries should demand a return to the goals of the collective security system, which in turn will guarantee their security. The fact that the developing countries comprise a significant proportion of UN membership is itself a reason for the United Nations to pay attention to the security requirements.

Another way of ensuring regional security is through regional self-reliance. Unity and co-operation are basic to the resolution of African security problems at the political and economic levels. African States should therefore work for the kind of common security advocated by the late Olof Palme of Sweden. This implies equal consideration of the security requirements of all States. The search for isolated security cannot guarantee world peace. The OAU is eminently placed to assume the role of the continental organization for the promotion of African security. However, there are severe limitations on the ability of the OAU to perform regional security functions. This is why the role of subregional institutions such as ECOWAS in promoting security in the West African subregion should be encouraged.

At present, the OAU meets annually as a General Assembly of African Heads of State and Government (similar to the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly). There is no African security council similar to the UN Security Council. Perhaps the African States should consider the desirability of establishing an African security council. The OAU, as a regional collective security arrangement, can then be found in the proposed African security council. The rules of procedure, practice and organization of an African security council need not be the same as the UN Security Council. But African States can learn from the experience of the UN Security Council.

Conflict Resolution in Africa

The ideal world is a world at peace, where there are no conflicts. Although the peace winds are currently blowing around the world, we cannot forget that since 1945, about 150 local wars have been fought with conventional arms in 70 countries, accounting for 20 million casualties. African States have their share of these conflicts with the attendant destructive effects.

It is not enough to manage crisis, it is necessary to prevent crisis as well. What measures have the African States taken in connection with the prevention of crisis, with crisis management and resolution of conflicts?

In accordance with the OAU Charter, African States have pledged to settle their disputes by peaceful means. For this purpose, they decided to establish an OAU commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. There is no doubt that this provision contains three very important elements for conflict resolution: mediation, conciliation and arbitration. The problem is that the OAU Commission has not often been used for resolving disputes. In fact, most OAU disputes that have arisen have been dealt with by *ad hoc* bodies. It is therefore suggested that the role of the Commission should be enhanced in order to encourage resort to it. At the subregional level, ECOWAS has concluded a protocol on non-aggression. The Protocol was concluded because of the realization that the economic and social objectives of the West African States members of ECOWAS cannot be attained "except in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among its members".

With regard to peace-keeping operations, there are no Charter provisions for carrying them out under the auspices of the OAU. Nevertheless, OAU has tried to engage in peace-keeping operations in Chad.

This operation should be seen as a courageous step in finding African solutions to African problems. The lessons learned from the operation are that in order to have successful African peace-keeping operations, the following conditions have to be fulfilled: a workable mandate; the consistent support of the OAU Member States; the readiness of OAU Member States to volunteer military personnel; and adequate financial arrangements. In this connection, OAU Member States with the capacities to do so should earmark units in their armed forces to be made available, when necessary, for service in OAU peace-keeping; finally, the active co-operation of the United Nations should be sought at critical moments of need, since the United Nations is the global forum primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In view of the fact that OAU Charter provisions are inadequate for conflict resolution, it is suggested that the role of the OAU Secretary-General be enhanced in the area of prevention of crisis. This will be similar to the role of the United Nations Secretary-General regarding early warning of crisis situations under article 99 of the UN Charter. Under this article, the United Nations Secretary-General may "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security".

At present, the role of the OAU Secretary-General is limited by the fact that he is designated as "Administrative Secretary-General". Perhaps this limitation could be eliminated by deleting the word "administrative" from his title. With these new powers, the OAU Secretary General will be able to perform early warning functions, capable of nipping African security problems in the bud before they escalate into major confrontations.

Economic and Social Dimensions of African Security

The resource base for determining the link between armaments and development is quite valid for Africa. On the one hand, Africa needs to acquire the means for defending her security; on the other hand, Africa, being underdeveloped, has a compelling need to preserve her limited resources for development purposes which are various and complex. The resulting competition between the two needs has created a dilemma for African States, whose clear preference is not to divert resources sorely needed for development into resolving security concerns.

Africa's share of arms expenditure and acquisition are small in global terms; however, it is substantial in comparison to available resources which Africa's share consumes. Moreover, Africa's share has led to an increase in her total external debt, including the debt service ratio. Twenty per cent of Africa's total debt of $US 230 billion is related to expenditure on armaments because Africa has to import all its arms and pay for them in foreign exchange.

Furthermore, increased arms expenditures may become threats to African security by encouraging suspicions and mistrust, which could create military rivalry and tensions, leading to armed conflict.

Today, while underdevelopment and declining prospects for development persist, the world is consuming about one trillion dollars on overarmament. There is a growing recognition that both overarmament and underdevelopment constitute threats to international peace and security.

African States should take steps to handle issues causing threats to their economic and social security. Suggested steps include creation of conditions for internal cohesion and political stability; increased efforts to resolve crisis situations. Relaxation of tensions promotes development; confidence-building measures should be taken at the regional and subregional levels. When there is a CBM, it generates collective security thinking; self-reliance of the African States is called for; African States should begin to address conversion issues, i.e., conversion from military to civilian industry; with regard to arms transfers, without the demand factor, the arms trade and race will not flourish. African States should develop a united approach to causes of threats to African peace and security.

The Role of Disarmament and Peace Education in the Search for African Security

The answer to the question "What is the real place of disarmament in the struggle for a peaceful and secure world?" will have to be found. Disarmament must be related first of all to peace and security, mankind's paramount goals. Disarmament alone will not solve all problems. But never has disarmament played a more crucial role. Consequently, the role of disarmament and peace education in the search for African security should not be underestimated. In general, lack of expertise is one of the obstacles to effective participation by the developing countries (including Africa) in contemporary international affairs. Effective participation by all African States is crucial to efforts towards the creation of conditions for continental peace and security. As African States become increasingly involved in efforts to promote security, development and disarmament, there is a need to organize regional training programmes through which African officials can acquire relevant expertise.

Such regional training programmes could include simulation exercises in the resolution of border disputes, including border demarcation; training of African troops for peace-keeping operations; confidence-building measures in Africa; studies on the meaning and implications of disarmament; economic and social consequences of the arms race as well as of disarmament; the relationship between disarmament, development and security.

The advantages of bringing together officials of different countries from Africa in such training programmes are enormous. For example, it will strengthen African States' capacities to participate effectively in matters of African security. It will make it possible for African States to become familiar with one another's security concerns and requirements, thereby gaining more understanding of the positions of one another; increased communication will result in improved African relations, which in turn will reflect positively on African approaches to questions of peace, security and disarmament; it will point the way towards a higher degree of international co-operation in looking for multilateral solutions to problems; and since the African officials trained will meet later when implementing African security policies, their interaction provides an opportunity to establish working relationships based on trust, which will go beyond the period of training. This process could be termed a "confidence-building measure".

The United Nations, which is the global forum for the promotion of international peace and security, has contributed to the training of African officials in matters of peace, disarmament and security. About thirty out of fifty-two African States have participated in the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme. The Programme has three components, i.e., the disarmament fellowship programme, regional disarmament workshops and disarmament advisory services. The disarmament fellowship programme comprises lectures on security and disarmament issues, both in their historical context and as the subject of current negotiations and deliberations; seminars on documentation and information in the field of security and disarmament, drafting exercises, research and writing of papers on peace, disarmament and related issues; conference practice and procedure/multilateral diplomacy; and simulation exercises. Under the regional disarmament workshops, the United Nations organized, here in Lagos, Nigeria, this Regional Disarmament Workshop for Africa, which will examine African security perceptions and requirements, including related regional issues. As part of its activities, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa has also been conducting training programmes on specific topics relating to peace and disarmament.

Concluding Remarks

As is evident in this paper, the contextual approach has been adopted in dealing with concepts of security. We have provided a definition of the multiple dimensions of security in the African context, identified factors which shape African security perceptions and requirements, noted some of the factors complicating African security concerns, considered the approaches (including disarmament approaches) which African States have taken to resolve their security concerns, noted the role of peace and disarmament education in the search for African peace and security, and offered practical suggestions for further action to be taken on specific aspects of security and disarmament in the African context.

We have noted earlier that the African States have declared Africa a nuclear-free zone in a resolution adopted by the OAU in 1964. That Declaration is now 25 years old. The time has come for the African States to transform the Declaration into a legally binding treaty. The following procedure is suggested for further action. Like the procedure followed in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, African States could, at the invitation of an African State, meet in conference and establish a preparatory committee for the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in Africa. It is not necessary to obtain the adherence of all African States from the beginning. It will be enough if the initial conference at which the preparatory committee is established consists of all the African States that are willing to participate. The preparatory committee, with the assistance of the United Nations could prepare the proposed draft treaty. The ground for seeking United Nations assistance has already been laid in paragraph 10 of UN General Assembly resolution 43/71 B, which requested the United Nations Secretary-General "to provide all necessary assistance that the OAU may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa". We have also suggested above ideas and documents which could be used by the Preparatory Committee as background materials.

With regard to common security for Africa, we have proposed above a structural change in the OAU, which will permit the creation of a sort of African security council, consisting of 10 African States. The proposed council should be able to convene at short notice and deal quickly and decisively with crisis situations. The annual Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government is not suited to performing the functions intended for the proposed African security council.

The "try OAU first" principle adopted by the African States should be pursued as an example of self-reliance. However, in order to attain self-reliance in the economic and social sense, African States should create an atmosphere of trust and peace for economic recovery, technological advance and scientific research and exchange. When confidence- and trust-building measures are taken, threats or perceived threats to security will be reduced and even eliminated. In such a situation, efforts and released resources can then be devoted to economic and social development.

MULTILATERAL SYSTEMS FOR THE PROMOTION OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

by

Olu Adeniji

Ambassador of Nigeria to France

"Multilateralism" is a term often applied to a wide array of co-operative diplomatic activities of States and international institutions especially directed at maintaining international peace and security and fostering international understanding. It aims at finding solutions to international disputes as well as the reduction of tensions in crisis situations between States, or the setting up of mechanisms for the pursuit of peace, development and social progress. As Professor Inis Claude, Jr., a well-known authority on the United Nations, aptly puts it, it also applies to such matters as: mobilizing the collective condemnation of a State whose behaviour is alleged to fall below acceptable international standards, organizing a general colloquium on the problems of the global situation and on national policies for dealing with those problems, drafting conventions of the sort which have come to be known as "international legislation", and formulating arrangements for the establishment of international programmes.

Modern international relations is traceable to the relatively stable system of sovereign States which emerged in Europe following the termination of the Thirty Years War – a war that ravaged late medieval Europe between 1618 and 1648. The European State system which was subsequently extended to other parts of the world not only recognized the right of States and peoples to live within their own defined geographical boundaries (territoriality), establish "their own forms of government (non-intervention)", but, perhaps more importantly, it sanctioned the right of States "to conduct relations with each other on an equal legal basis (sovereign equality)". The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended the hitherto existing practice of States employing natural law for the guidance of relations between them; in its place was founded a new concept of international law based on the principle of voluntary and mutual agreements between sovereign States.

The first significant landmark in its evolution was the Congress of Vienna, held in 1814-1815 to end the Napoleonic Wars, which "agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under the immediate auspices of the Sovereigns themselves or by their respective Ministers, meetings for the examination of the measures which at each of these epochs shall be considered most salutary for the repose and prosperity of the Nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe".

From the point of view of the development of multilateralism, the Congress was significant in its turning of diplomacy from a rather suspicious activity of an essentially bilateral and 'secret' nature to one intended to serve the international system and the individual sovereign State members of the system. The Congress resulted in the mutual promise of States to "concert together" against any future threat to their newly installed system, and specifically under Article VI of the Treaty of Chaumont.

The gains of the Congress system evolved at Vienna were complemented by the other actions taken by governments to deal with the problems of achieving peace and security. Important amongst these actions were the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which are often cited as the two first disarmament conferences for reasons we shall soon see. The first, summoned at the instance of Czar Nicholas of Russia, was aimed at holding an international conference to discuss the regulation of use of weapons in war. It prohibited the use of the dum-dum bullet which expanded and flattened in the human body causing more serious wounds than other bullets. The 1907 Conference adopted a Convention which prohibited the use of arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; it prohibited in particular the use of poison or poisonous weapons.

The development of this multilateral approach was stopped by the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

The experience of the war convinced statesmen of the need to establish a mechanism which would ensure that the post-war international system would function properly so that the "Great War" would be "the war to end all wars". The primary objective of the League was to prevent future collapse of the international system by promoting international cooperation for peace and security. The League experiment failed when it could not prevent the violation of its Covenant by its members. The ensuing Second World War however reinforced the necessity for an effective multilateral system for the maintenance and promotion of international security.

The creation of the United Nations even before the Second World War formally ended emphasized this need. Though it did not presage the world government that the World Federalists wanted, it nevertheless embodied in its Charter wide-ranging elements for the orderly governance of international relations. The system of collective security envisaged in the Charter was meant to represent a great advance in collaborative efforts to deter a country or group of countries from plunging the world into conflict through acts of aggression. Thus, Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter lists the first purpose of the United Nations as being:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures...for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace..."

The primary instrument for carrying out this task was the Security Council, especially its core of five permanent members which, having been the Allies that defeated Germany and the Axis Powers were presumed to be able to continue to agree on steps necessary to maintain the world order they thus created. In Article 24 members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

How does the Charter envisage the maintenance of international security? Chapters VI and VII deal extensively with the pacific settlement of disputes (VI) and enforcement measures (VII). These measures may be summarized:

(a) peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in Articles 33-36. Article 33 provides for solution of inter-State disputes by way of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice;

(b) through action by the Security Council either in obliging the parties to the dispute the continuation of which might endanger international peace and security to settle or by recommending terms of settlement;

(c) in the case of aggression or action with respect to threats to peace, enforcement action by the Security Council ranging from sanctions (Article 41) to military action (Article 42). To the latter end, all members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call armed forces, assistance and facilities. Article 45

envisages member States holding ready national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action.

In the early years of the United Nations, the General Assembly endeavoured to elaborate on the Charter provisions on the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It adopted in April 1949 (resolution 268 A(III)) the Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which elaborated on the methodology for Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation. Though the Act entered into force in September 1950 it has been largely ignored, especially as only 7 States acceded to it.

The General Assembly sought to revive its effort at institutionalizing the peaceful settlement of international dispute in the context of the work of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations. The Assembly in 1982 adopted the Manila Declaration on the settlement of international disputes. The Declaration was of course a far cry from the original proposal for an international convention on the subject of the settlement of international disputes.

With the paralysis of the Security Council by ideological division between the permanent members, the United Nations has not been able to fulfil the peace-making role envisaged in the Charter. Rather a secondary device of peace-keeping has become the positive role of the Organization in conflict situations. Since the Nobel Peace Prize for 1988 was awarded to the United Nations Peace-keeping Forces, one can say that peace-keeping has gained great recognition as a major element in the multilateral system for the maintenance of international peace.

Sydney Bailey, author of "How Wars End: the United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1945-1964", described international peace-keeping as the most original and positive diplomatic invention since the Second World War. He went on to state that a peace-keeping operation is a symbol of international concern, a tranquillizer deliberately designed so as not to affect the local political situation. He does in my view express both the strength and the weakness of this substitute development for enforcement to prevent conflicts or punish an aggressor. Peace-keeping has not been widely accepted as one of the achievements of the United Nations, whether in the Suez, in the Congo, in Sinai, in the Golan Heights, in Lebanon, or in Cyprus or lately in Namibia. The imposition of an international force has had a tranquillizing effect on the situation. However, peace-keeping also has a way of freezing an unsettled situation, not to mention its reliance on the goodwill of all parties. While peace-keeping suffices as an interim measure, it does not resolve the problem itself. The capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security will depend on the positive attitudes of the member States to make use of the Organization, and particularly on the willingness of the permament members of the Security Council to use the special responsibility and privilege conferred on them by a multilateral system which they tend increasingly to despise.

The development of United Nations Peace-keeping Operations has also had an effect on the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the Organization's fulfilment of its Charter obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 99 of the Charter stipulates that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Successive Secretaries-General have sparingly had resort to the power under this provision mainly because of the realization of the ideological complications which international disputes tend to acquire. The first time Hammarskjöld acted under Article 99 was to bring the Congo Crisis to the attention of the Security Council in July 1960. Notwithstanding the difficulties his subsequent actions in the Congo provoked, he nevertheless sought to develop Article 99 to imply a Secretary-General's right to independent fact-finding, to assist him in briefing the Security Council. Hammarskjöld's famous Oxford Address is memorable in this connection. Subsequent Secretaries-General have been hesitant to use Article 99 (only Waldheim used it in 1974 requesting the Security Council to strengthen the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and in 1979 in bringing the United States/Iran Hostage Crisis before the Security Council).

Notwithstanding the view credited to Premier Nikita Khrushchev that there were neutral States but no neutral persons, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in my view, by virtue of the office, should be able to play a more active role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The quiet diplomacy of a Secretary-General can help in diffusing a potentially explosive situation as was often the case in the early years of the United Nations and has again been shown lately in the Iraq/Iran War and in Afghanistan.

If the United Nations is at the apex of the multilateral system, there are other possibilities envisaged in the Charter which have been resorted to. Article 51 recognized the right of individual or collective self-defence *if an armed attack occurs against a Member State* until the Security Council has taken necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. This has since been exploited to create military alliances which have substituted their security concepts for the collective security of the Charter. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were the first concrete manifestations of the breakdown of the presumed consensus on which the oligarchy of the five permanent members of the Security Council was based. Much to the detriment of the security of non-Alliance countries, the bipolar division of the world by the two Alliances became the dominant feature of international relations in the post-war years. (Walter Lippman, etc.). This became the strategic reality to which the States of the third world which emerged after World War II had to adjust, complicating their security problems first through the requirement of the two Alliances to spread their influence, second through the neglect of the security requirement of the two Alliances to spread their influence, and thirdly through the absorption of the power paradigm by third world leaders themselves.

Article 52 of the United Nations Charter made provision for the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. The regional organizations that have since sprung up include the OAS, the OAU, the Arab League and the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Indeed, there is hardly a region where a regional association of a type to discuss issues of regional security does not exist. Depending on the structure, some of the organizations, like the OAU, have had some effect in regional matters subject of course to the constraint of big Power involvement.

The perspective of security that underlay the United Nations Charter was one that laid greater emphasis on the regulation of armaments rather than disarmament. The term disarmament occurs in Chapter II of the Charter whereby the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security including the principles governing disarmament and regulation of armament and may make recommendations. However, when the Charter defines the powers and functions of the Security

Council in Article 26, the term "disarmament" does not occur. The Article reads: "In order to promote..."

Two developments changed the pace and the focus from management of armaments to disarmament. These are: emergence of nuclear weapons and the arms race of the two military Alliances. The use of nuclear weapons in August 1945 introduced an urgency into the consideration of disarmament. Instead of waiting for the Security Council to formulate plans for the regulation of armaments the General Assembly plunged headlong into establishing its own priority for disarmament negotiation. It was very specific in its first resolution on 24 January 1946 which established the Atomic Energy Commission. The mandate of the Commission was to urgently make specific proposals for the *elimination from national arsenals* of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. This early effort to confine the atomic genie to its bottle foundered on the obvious unwillingness of the United States to forego its monopoly of the new weapon. Even as early as January 1946, the arms race which the two Alliances were to represent was foreshadowed by the two major Powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – which emerged on the exhaustion of the old European Powers by the Second World War. Their ideological division soon after the war led to the mutual distrust occasioned by the United States monopoly of the atomic bomb and the overwhelming numerical superiority of Soviet armed forces. Consideration of atomic weapons therefore came to be balanced by simultaneous negotiations on conventional weapons through the creation of the Commission on Conventional Weapons by the Security Council in February 1947. Progress was impossible in both fora of negotiations, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Weapons. The development of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union, the formation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances, the later development of nuclear-weapon capability by the United Kingdom, France and China, and the buildup of conventional armaments by the two Alliances all greatly complicated the process of multilateral disarmament efforts.

The significance of the initiative taken by the General Assembly in resolution 1 (I) lies in the fact that by going beyond its strict mandate in Chapter II of the Charter, it carved out a more important role for the representative Assembly. This is to prove important in view of the paralysis of the Security Council by the arms race among the permament members. Even if it cannot negotiate, the General Assembly can at least, through its deliberations and resolutions, press for appropriate negotiations. The evolution of that role saw the gradual focus on the First Committee of the General Assembly almost exclusively on disarmament and international security matters. A combination of the increased danger posed by the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, and the fear it engendered in the ever increasingly non-aligned and neutral members of the United Nations led to the consolidation of the role of the General Assembly as the apex of the machinery for deliberations and establishing the framework for multilateral disarmament. Thus, it is that the first ever Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament held at the initiative of the Non-Aligned in 1978 laid down principles, programme and machinery for disarmament which were universally approved. In the Final Document of the Special Session, the United Nations postulated "In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament". In dealing with the machinery required to ensure that the United Nations plays that role, the Special Session emphasized the need for the revitalisation of the two kinds of bodies – deliberative and negotiating – which have evolved since 1946. It emphasized that all member States should be represented on the former; as for the latter, it should for the sake of convenience have a relatively small membership. The General Assembly was thus confirmed as the main deliberative organ of disarmament (paragraph 115 (FD SSOD I). The First Committee was henceforth to deal only with questions of disarmament and related international security issues (para. 117). A subsidiary body – the Disarmament Commission composed of all Member States of the United Nations was established to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to report annually to the General Assembly (para. 118).

As far as the negotiating body was concerned, the Special Session emphasized the great importance it attached to the participation of all nuclear- weapon States in it. Thus, the existing Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was reconstituted so as to include all five nuclear- weapon States and thirty-two to thirty-five others (para. 120). The body is now known as the Conference on Disarmament, sitting in Geneva and being responsible to the United Nations without legally being an organ of the Organization.

It is necessary to point out that while cognizance is given to bilateral (USA/USSR) and regional disarmament negotiations (the CAFE Negotiations) as important inputs in the disarmament process, the Conference on Disarmament is recognized as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field.

The machinery as reconstituted by the Special Session in 1978 was completed by strengthening of the appropriate arm of the United Nations Secretariat, which was at that time a Centre for Disarmament. Further measures later transformed the Centre into a full-fledged Department for Disarmament Affairs whose activities must have been the fastest growing in the United Nations Secretariat in the past decade.

To underscore the necessity for research and studies as important elements in furthering multilateral disarmament process, the United Nations has since established specific guidelines for carrying out such studies. The main aims of these studies are broadly to inform, to assist ongoing negotiations and to stimulate fresh negotiations.

The interrelationship between security and disarmament has been the subject of considerable debate and has often led to confusion as to which comes before the other. The arms race itself traces its origin to the search of States for security in a world that has abandoned the Charter provisions of non-aggression, non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes. Security came to be inextricably linked with the ability of a State to defend its core values – its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, its economic structure and system – from external aggression. To fulfil this function the requirement is obviously military strength. Not surprisingly therefore the emphasis came to be placed on State power as the best guarantee of security. Security doctrines developed after the emergence of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States are hinged on deterrence whereby nuclear deterrence became the central point for the prevention of war. With the distrust of the efficacy of the system of collective security, the Alliance system developed a security doctrine that encompassed the entire globe, since the expansion of the influence of one is seen as implying the diminution of the security of the other. Thus, the Euro-centred concept of security became universalized and distorted to a large extent the requirements of security in the third world and what should be the relationship between State military power and State security. Over-emphasis on military power thus became, more than ever, ideological rivalry, the greatest threat to international peace and security. As the Final

Document of SSOD I stated, "The attainment of the objective of security which is an inseparable element of peace has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms .... yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind ...". In the first instance the existence of 50,000 nuclear warheads (that can destroy the world several times over) in the arsenals of the nuclear- weapon States has not guaranteed international peace and security as witnessed by the number of armed conflicts that occurs world-wide. Nor has it even given the possessors of these arsenals the feeling of national security, as witnessed by their continued search for better offensive and defensive capabilities. As for the smaller States, their security is held captive to the interplay of the nuclear and conventional arsenals of the super-Powers and their allies. On the one hand, they are insecure as long as the entire world lives precariously under the super-Power nuclear Sword of Damocles. On the other hand the periodic interference arising out of the ideological and strategic interests of the Alliances obliges many States to acquire arms beyond what might have been ordinarily necessary.

Serious studies on security with particular reference to the third world have since shown that acquisition of military power by the State beyond a rational level often undermines rather than enhances security. Very often the resources devoted to arms acquisition represent critical diminution of resources available for very urgent social and economic programmes. Internal discontent arising out of unmet needs of the people is a potent cause of national insecurity.

The aim of disarmament is not to undermine security. On the contrary, it is to enhance security at the lowest level of military acquisition. Where insecurity is the result of internal socio-economic problems, as in many parts of the third world, arms acquisition may aggravate the situation. Thus a focus on the non-military threats to security enables a broadening of the multilateral system for the maintenance of security. Multilateral efforts at resolving the non-military threats can reduce the necessity for arms acquisition and thus avoid regional arms races. Greater recognition of the triangular relationship between security, disarmament and development will enrich the multilateral system for the promotion of security, enabling it to give greater emphasis to co-operation for a more just international order in which all peoples have reasonable expectation of an equitable share of global development. This will also imply greater efforts to use the mechanism of the United Nations as originally intended, and, as developed by the Olof Palme Commission, common security would imply non-ideological approaches to the resolution of international problems, permitting the third world countries in particular a greater role in the solution of their own regional problems for instance.

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

by

Emeka Azikiwe

Ambassador of Nigeria to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

Within the past two days, we have been listening to presentations and intense discussions on one of the most important and crucial issues of our time – disarmament. I must say that my task has been made fairly easy by the previous speakers who already highlighted specific areas in the field of global disarmament, especially as it relates to African security. My presentation will focus on the ongoing negotiations in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament with emphasis on African participation. The scope of disarmament activities is so complex and does not permit one to tackle in great detail the overall progress and prospects. My presentation is by no means exhaustive, and does not offer a ready-made solution to the intricate problems and policy issues which have compounded the negotiations.

The theme of the Workshop, "African Security and other Related Issues", is particularly timely as global co-operation in the prevention and removal of threats to peace and security has decidedly passed the stage of being a vision. The year 1988 will be remembered as particularly significant in the history of disarmament process, in view of the highly propitious international climate. This positive trend has been underscored by the tremendous improvement in the relations between the two major nuclear- weapon States, which had often remained sour and constantly impeded progress in disarmament efforts. Just over a year ago, the Soviet Union and the United States of America successfully concluded the historic Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles (the INF Treaty), which has put into motion the actual process of eliminating all land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Efforts are also being intensified for an agreement on a 50% reduction of the strategic nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers.

We had hoped that the momentum generated by these significant developments would be reflected in the multilateral fora dealing with disarmament and security. Regrettably, there is an increasing sign of preference among some States, notably nuclear- weapon States, for a bilateral or even unilateral approach to issues which are of global concern. While both unilateral and bilateral initiatives could be helpful, it is evident that we cannot indefinitely rely on the goodwill of the super-Powers as nuclear disarmament is the legitimate concern of all countries.

In my view, the problems of disarmament today are so complex, and while only a few countries possess nuclear weapons, they cannot on their own dictate solutions, as we shall all be victims of a nuclear war. None of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity posesses nuclear weapons. Indeed, they do not intend to pursue such ambitions.

Nigeria has a long tradition in participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe the issues under consideration are vitally important, as disarmament is not the concern of an exclusive club. There is no substitute for a multilateral negotiating body like the Conference on Disarmament, as global issues require active and continuous participation of all countries. This is not only desirable, but also necessary; admittedly, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is often shaped by events which take place outside the forum.

Let me briefly dwell on the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the world's single forum for multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament. The usefulness of the body has become a matter of concern to many. At the moment, the Conference on Disarmament's standing is high, and there is an enlarging view beyond, that in spite of its imperfections, it holds positive value in the quest for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Conference on Disarmament was established in 1978 at the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD I). It held its first session in 1979 as the Committee on Disarmament, advancing the negotiating efforts of its predecessors, including the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNDC) from 1959-1960, Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) from 1962-1969 and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from 1969-1978. Even though the ENDC and CCD used the United Nations facilities, they were established outside the framework of the United Nations under the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States. Meetings were not open to the public. Besides, France, a member of the United Nations, never took part in the negotiations, and China was not a member.

The Conference on Disarmament as it is currently constituted has a membership of 40 States, including 7 African States: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Zaire. The mandate of the CD is to promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It has a unique relationship with the United Nations and defines its own rules of procedure as well as develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations of the General Assemby. It would be recalled that last year, the General Assembly reaffirmed in resolution 43/78 I that the Conference on Disarmament plays a vital role in the field of disarmament for the world community. Similarly, in resolution 43/78 M, the General Assembly called on the CD to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through substantive negotiations, within the *ad hoc* committees.

Indeed the CD was urged to provide negotiating mandates to *ad hoc* committees on all agenda items, in keeping with the fundamental role of the Conference as identified in the Final Document of SSOD. It is pertinent to observe that the rules of procedure stipulate that all decisions must be adopted by consensus. It is evident that this occasionally impedes progress in the negotiations. A good example is the stalemate in the deliberations on the issue of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. While a large majority of delegations are convinced that a working group with a negotiating mandate to work on a draft treaty on this very important subject is appropriate, only one delegation continues to hold up the work of the Conference, ostensibly because it holds the view that there are inadequate means of verifying such a treaty and that a nuclear- test ban is a long-term objective. That delegation has therefore categorically declared its unpreparedness to consider a treaty banning all nuclear tests, even in its draft form, at the Conference. The Conference is obliged to respect that view.

Another contentious issue is the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. While the Conference has actually decided to increase its membership by four, the problem remains how to choose the four new members without disturbing the present balance among the three informal groups. Thus, while it has been agreed that both the Western and Socialist groups would nominate one country each, the Group of 21, by virtue of its size, would have two. Due to the fact that various regions of the world are represented in the Group of 21, there has not been any consensus on the two new members. The Group of 21 comprises non-aligned and neutral countries in the CD, including Sweden and Mexico. Romania is not a member of the group though it has observer status in the Group.

The Secretary-General of the CD, Mr. Miljan Komatina, a Yugoslav national, is the Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. Within the framework of its permanent agenda, the Conference at the first session this year which commenced on 7 February for a duration of three months agreed to consider the following major disarmament issues. Consideration of these items will continue in the summer session, from June-August.

1. Nuclear- test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
4. Chemical weapons
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

Work on five of these subjects continued in subsidiary bodies: The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons; the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons; the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament; and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

Status of Negotiations on Agenda Items of the Conference on Disarmament

Nuclear -Test Ban

This is one of the three items accorded the highest priority on the agenda of the CD.

Although the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, it did not ban underground tests, which have continued unabated. Secondly, two nuclear- weapon States, China and France, did not sign the 1963 test ban Treaty.

The Group of 21 and the Socialist Group have each consistently submitted draft proposals for the establishment of a subsidiary body, with a view to elaborating a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests. There has so far been no consensus in the CD on setting up such a subsidiary body. The Western Group has consistently prevented consensus on the proposals, arguing that the questions of verification and compliance have to be solved first.

Also, the United States insists that a nuclear- test ban continues to be its long-term objective. However, by its resolution 39/52, the General Assembly expressed, in 1984, the conviction that the existing means of verification were adequate to ensure compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and that the alleged absence of such means of verification was nothing but a screen for further development and refinement of nuclear weapons. Efforts are currently being made to convert the partial test- ban Treaty to a comprehensive test- ban Treaty. Nigeria's position on this item is in line with that of the Group of 21.

Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

This item has been on the agenda of the CD since 1983. It has since then been considered in the plenary, including proposals for the establishment of a subsidiary body, but no consensus has been reached. Proposals in this respect are geared towards the initiation of multilateral negotiations or agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages, for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and

(c) Substantial reduction in the existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination.

The Western Group, like in other cases, does not support draft mandates for the establishment of a working group on these items, as introduced by the Group of 21 and the Socialist Group, arguing that they should be the subjects of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR.

Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters

This item has also been on the agenda of the CD since 1983. The Group of 21 has been submitting working papers calling for the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group to undertake negotiations on practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The Group of Socialist States has, in a working paper, called for the establishment of an *ad hoc* body to negotiate concrete steps on the subject, including the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a global treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. There was, however, no consensus on these proposals. The Western Group has repeatedly stated that they are not prepared to accept any mandate, full or limited, on the establishment of a subsidiary body on this item. They had underlined the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in preventing war and preserving peace in Europe, and hold that nuclear weapons continue to be a basic element in the maintenance of international peace and security.

General observations on agenda items 1-3

1 July and 8 August 1988 marked the 10th and the 25th anniversaries of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the signing of the partial test- ban Treaty, respectively. Nigeria is a party to both Treaties and indeed was the very first among the 40-member Conference on Disarmament to ratify the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was generally felt that both Treaties would help to create a safer world by discouraging further testing of nuclear weapons, thereby ending proliferation, whether vertical or horizontal. The two Treaties imposed concrete obligations on their depositary governments, which include the call on the two major nuclear-weapon States, "to... seek to

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achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

Much as it has been said that "no new nuclear-weapon State" has emerged since the entry into force of the NPT, it would amount to cold comfort to imagine that all is well with the non-proliferation régime.

The step-by-step approach adopted by the two major nuclear-weapon States – which would permit testing at agreed yields and at defined intervals of time – unfortunately has the tendency of legitimizing nuclear testing. Moreover, it falls far short of preventing the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The question at issue is the global prohibition of nuclear testing. Since the subject concerns the vital security interest of all nations, it falls more appropriately within the purview of the Conference on Disarmament.

This notwithstanding, there are some reservations about the usefulness of the ritualized general debate on nuclear disarmament at the CD. Many say that there is an element of repetitiveness which ought to have become boring were the danger which evokes these constant repititions not so menacing. It is a painful fact that since the Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, we have witnessed rapid development in the recourse towards acquisition of arms and their perfection to such an unprecedented degree of precision of lethality, thereby placing mankind on the brink of catastrophe.

Hence, an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests would not only check the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, but also prevent their proliferation, both vertically and horizontally. This agreement will mark a significant beginning of the assumption by nuclear-weapon States of their obligation under the non-proliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards the cessation of the nuclear- arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Fourth Review Conference of Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty is scheduled for 1990. The Preparatory Committee will hold its first session in New York during the first week of May 1989. The NPT was conceived as an important instrument to be complemented by other collateral measures for an effective régime of non-proliferation; it was not meant to constitute the whole structure. Indeed, failure to adopt necessary complementary measures has already created sharp divisions and reduced its effectiveness.

Chemical weapons

The prospects of concluding an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention are now far more promising and will eventually lead to a complete ban on their development, production and stockpiling, and to the destruction of all existing chemical weapons. Chemical weapons not only present a grave potential risk, but the dangers posed by the harmful effects on civilian populations actually represent a crime against humanity. Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction which are next only to nuclear weapons in their lethality. When we recall the bitter experience of dreadful devastation on mankind by the unrestrained use of chemical weapons in World War I, we must stand united to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol which symbolizes the total repudiation of such an inadmissible offence against humanity.

Regrettably, chemical weapons, though now restricted, have not been totally excluded as a means of warfare.

Considering that the sheer existence of chemical weapons provides an irresistible incentive for their use, most observers feel that the most effective means of eliminating the risk of the use of such weapons is the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. Such a convention has been under negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and its predecessors for about two decades, seeking to complete the job started by the Geneva Protocol. It is noteworthy that in 1972, negotiations were completed on the Convention on the prohibition and destruction of biological and toxic weapons Convention which entered into force on 20 March 1975. Compliance remains a problem. Like the 1925 Protocol, the Convention lacks verification mechanism and relies on good faith and self-interest to assure compliance.

However, as Ambassador Olu Adeniji, the leader of the Nigerian delegation at the Paris Conference last January, observed: "Our concern for chemical weapons must go far beyond the periodic expression of abhorrence about their use... The issue of chemical weapons should be tackled from source... If the use of any weapon of mass destruction is reprehensible, so should be its development, production, stockpile and transfer. Thus international emotion should not be whipped upon when there is suspected use of chemical weapons."

Much work has now been done on the draft convention and its conclusion is now in sight. It is gratifying to note that the convention will have a distinct advantage over the Geneva Protocol as it will ensure the non-use of chemical weapons through total elimination.

There are still a number of outstanding issues under consideration. Apart from the exact definition and elimination of production facilities, there are still activities not covered by the convention. Even though we all agree that the convention should provide an effective mechanism for verification, how do we ensure that the chemical industry is not used in the production of chemical weapons? I need not emphasize that some work still remains to be done on the question of challenge inspection or limited spot check arrangements to ensure that the equal rights of all States can be guaranteed. The general feeling is that the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its efforts to conclude the outstanding work on the convention at the earliest possible time. The spirit of mutual concession and of mature compromise is required at this stage to overcome the outstanding differences.

Prevention of an Arms Race In Outer Space

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the subjects being considered in the CD against the background of increasing technological advances in space science. At its 1985 spring session, the Conference on Disarmament established an *Ad Hoc* Committee with a mandate to examine, as a first step, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This mandate, which has been adopted for the *Ad Hoc* Committee over the years, is quite inadequate in dealing with the problems of space weapons, but had to be accepted only "as a first step" towards more concrete and definitive measures. With the mandate, nothing much has been achieved under this item.

We can no longer deny the fact that the legal régime governing activities of States in outer space is grossly inadequate to the task of preventing an arms race there. The legal régime has since been overtaken by rapid developments in science and technology which were not foreseen when the Treaties were drawn up. Although the military activities currently taking place in space do not, as yet, involve the use of weapons, it would be timely at this stage to adopt necessary measures to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. Such a race would be extremely expensive and highly destabilizing. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.

Security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States

By ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the non-nuclear-weapon States voluntarily refrained from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, most of the non-nuclear-weapon States are not members of the military alliances – NATO or Warsaw Pact – and are consequently not protected by their security arrangements. Hence, the non-nuclear- weapon States, in the Group of 21, are pursuing efforts to conclude "effective arrangements" to provide them with assurances that nuclear weapons, which they have given up the right to produce in order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime, will not be used against them.

The working group on this agenda item has each year been re-established by the Conference on Disarmament, except for 1986. The nuclear-weapon States have made declarations of the non-use of these weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. The question at issue which the non-nuclear-weapon States are stressing is that declarations are not adequate and that security guarantees should be given through an international convention. In effect, they call for these declarations to be entered in an "international instrument of a legally-binding character" that will "effectively assure" their security. Presently, no such international convention is being worked out in the CD.

Security for all States will either have to be sought in ways other than the possession of nuclear weapons, or all States should be accorded the right to determine the means, including the possession of nuclear weapons for protecting their security. All the same, I believe that Nigeria's commitment to the non-proliferation régime still remains firm.

Radiological weapons

Just as we are worried about the extreme danger posed by the use of chemical weapons, we are equally concerned about the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes. Nigeria's position on this matter is well known. Indeed, we had co-sponsored a resolution at the 43rd session of the United Nations General Assembly requesting the Conference on Disarmament to take into account in the ongoing negotiation for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the deliberate employment of nuclear waste to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons had already commenced its work in the CD. Views have been expressed within the CD on the non-existence of radiological weapons and the narrow chances of their being used in warfare. However, the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes has been identified as an effective means of conducting radiological warfare. Indeed, we all subscribe to paragraph 76 of the Final Document of SSOD I, which states, *inter alia*, that "a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

It is noteworthy that at the last General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a decision was taken to establish a Working Group of Experts with the objective of formulating an internationally agreed code of practice for international transactions involving nuclear wastes.

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

General and complete disarmament under effective international control continues to be the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts. The CD has each year re-established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, but it has failed to elaborate such a programme, despite several United Nations General Assembly resolutions. I need hardly emphasize how crucial it is for progress on a comprehensive test- ban treaty to be evident before the commencement of the NPT Review Conference in 1990. A forward looking decision by the Conference on a comprehensive test- ban treaty is absolutely essential for the preservation of the régime of non-proliferation embodied in the NPT. Indeed, a comprehensive test- ban treaty is potentially less restrictive and might open the way for non- NPT signatories to become parties.

The commitment of the nuclear- weapon States in negotiating a comprehensive test- ban treaty is no doubt essential. Similarly, the role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating such a treaty should never be in doubt. If it is to discharge its responsibility as the single multilateral negotiating body, the Conference should commence without further delay negotiations on the achievement of nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament. A major ingredient for success is flexibility or goodwill on the part of the delegations, especially those from nuclear- weapon States. But is this "goodwill" forthcoming? We need also to demonstrate the political will to accomplish the entire process in the shortest possible time, otherwise the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament will continue to elude us.

Finally, a word on confidence-building measures. This is an area of disarmament efforts which is increasingly gaining attention, especially the regional approach. Within the Conference on Disarmament, reference has been made to the negotiations on further confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional disarmament in Europe currently being held at Vienna. Naturally, States in any region are the best judge of their requirements, and any security initiative will have to emanate from them. It is often said that the key to global peace is in Europe, as nuclear war in that region would engulf the entire world. Obviously, such a regional approach can facilitate global disarmament provided it is not at the expense of the overall multilateral efforts towards complete and general disarmament.

All the same, if regional efforts are to contribute effectively to a global disarmament process, the United Nations will have to assume its responsibility in providing assistance in the painstaking process of negotiating the terms of settlement. The more events unfold in various parts of the world, the more caution is required in the approach to the concept of confidence-building measures, which should be based on trust and goodwill among States. In a region where there exists no trust whatsoever between States, where clearly one State is bent on destabilizing the entire region, it will be premature to think of possible wavs of creating confidence in such a situation.

The nuclear weapons programme of South Africa is in direct contrast to the expressed wishes and aspirations of Africa, and a threat to their collective wish for a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa bears true testimony to this honest intention. The realization of this noble objective has been frustrated by the Pretoria régime. It has now been established that Pretoria has amassed sufficient uranium to produce up to 21 nuclear warheads. This will no doubt confer on the Pretoria régime the status of a nuclear Power. Surely it would be unrealistic to expect the African States to entrust the safety of their region to the racist Pretoria régime, which has repeatedly conceived such weapons as a clear military option.

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFRICA

by

Koffi Adjoyi

Ambassador of Togo to the United Nations

This workshop confirms and illustrates the vitality and effectiveness shown by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in the performance of its functions and the highly significant and central role which the United Nations is called upon to play in the promotion of disarmament efforts.

The preceding speakers have each brilliantly presented specific aspects of the security problem, which is a veritable challenge to the entire international community. It is now for me to speak to you on the question of disarmament and development.

We might first of all consider why a topic such as disarmament and development should be dealt with as part of a seminar on security. It is easy to see that disarmament, a corollary of the security question, makes it possible to release resources for development purposes. Thus there is a link between security, disarmament and development, a triangular relationship that has been amply demonstrated by the experts.

In this context, it should be pointed out that in the Final Document of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Nicosia from 5 to 10 September 1988 (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council document A/43/667 and S/20212 of 4 October 1988), the Ministers reaffirmed that disarmament; the relaxation of international tension; respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations – in particular, the sovereign equality of all States, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-recourse to the use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and unity or the political independence of any State – the total elimination of colonialism, *apartheid* and all other forms of racial discrimination, aggression and occupation; respect for the right to self-determination and national independence; respect for human rights; economic and social development; and the strengthening of international peace and security were closely interrelated.

This helps us to understand why the subject of disarmament and development is fully appropriate in the context of our seminar on security.

The question which I have the honour of discussing today, the relationship between disarmament and development, is one of those to which the international community has devoted the most attention in its search for ways and means of promoting and achieving arms limitation and disarmament.

Furthermore, the history of the multilateral consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development is closely linked to efforts to organize and even to reorganize the international community on bases and according to objectives and methods of action designed to help create a more peaceful, stable, secure and just world.

In this connection, it should be recalled that the first Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899 came to the conclusion that it would be highly desirable to limit the military expenditures burdening the world at that time in order to increase the material and moral well-being of mankind. Reflecting the continuation of the arms buildup, the second Peace Conference at The Hague, held in 1907, stressed that in view of the fact that military expenditures had increased considerably in nearly all countries since 1899, it was highly desirable for Governments to resume their serious consideration of that question.

It should also be pointed out that in the light of what we had learned from the two World Wars and with a view to creating a world of peace and progress, the founding fathers of the United Nations felt it appropriate to set limits on expenditure on armaments.

Thus, while enshrining the legitimate right of all Member States of the United Nations to individual and collective security, the Charter provides in Article 26 for promotion of "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources".

The extent of the expenditure on armaments and the need for limiting it to promote economic and social development had therefore been perceived well before and immediately after the serious slide into militarism and acts of belligerence that marked the first half of the twentieth century.

However, the idea of establishing a link between disarmament and development really took shape with the General Assembly's adoption, beginning in 1950, of a number of resolutions advocating a global reduction of military expenditure and reallocation of the funds thus released to economic and social purposes, in particular to benefit the developing countries. Further, since 1973 there have been several proposals to reduce military budgets and use the savings to assist development.

The real and growing interest of the international community in establishing a relationship between disarmament and development has been reflected by a series of expert studies carried out at the request of the United Nations and dealing in particular with the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditure, the relationship between disarmament and development and the modalities for the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development.

The value of these studies has been to enlighten the international community objectively on the underlying dynamics of armament expenditure and development efforts.

The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987, was a historic event of great political importance in the multilateral consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development.

The complexity of the question is such as to merit the clearest possible presentation. This is why I have adopted a three-fold approach consisting of a combination of the historical, analytical and practical aspects. This will involve highlighting, first, the efforts at establishing the relationship between disarmament and development, second, the international recognition of this relationship and requirements for making it a reality, and third and last, the African situation.

PART I:The Attempt to Establish a Connection between Disarmament and Development; Moving from the Moral Argument to the Scientific Approach

The attempt to establish a connection between disarmament and development is historically rooted in morality, deriving from a perception of the growing interdependence of human activities and a scientific approach to the interaction of disarmament and development.

A. The Moral Argument

In its dedication to the ideals of peace, freedom, justice, equality and progress in the context of a community of interests and against the background of human destiny, the setting up of the United Nations was without any doubt at all one of the most remarkable and the most noble acts aimed at the achievement and consolidation of solidarity between peoples and co-operation between States in the history of mankind.

The evocation of these ideals certainly validates the moral argument which underpinned initially, and continued for some time to do so, the existence of the claimed link between disarmament and development. This argument states in essence that it is unjust and morally inadmissible that human, scientific, technical, economic and financial resources should be lavishly expended on the manufacture and continuing refinement of means by which man and his environment may be destroyed at a time when economic and social progress is very unevenly distributed in the world.

The striking contrast between the scale of the resources devoted to armament and the continuing and worsening economic and social difficulties in the developing world clearly runs counter to the tenets of international solidarity. Everything suggests that the military expenditure called for to ensure security is given priority over the needs of economic and social development. It is morally inexcusable that these needs should be sacrificed in the interests of military defence, especially when the release of even a small part of the enormous resources absorbed by the arms race could alleviate the sufferings of large numbers of deprived persons throughout the world.

In spite of the justice and nobility of the moral argument, it has made little headway against the doctrines and strategies embodied in the political aim of national security. Although nuclear weapons represent the most serious threat there has ever been to the survival of human civilization, the nuclear deterrent is defended by its advocates as a powerful means of preventing war, which has kept the world in peaceful equilibrium since the Second World War.

B. The Impact of the Realization that Human Activities are Increasingly Interdependent

One argument in favour of the diversification and intensification of international co-operation, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral, is that political, economic, social, cultural, military, scientific, technical and humanitarian activities, both those linked with the environment and others, are progressively extending beyond their traditional boundaries.

This situation cannot fail to influence the search for and achievement of a solution to the major challenges facing the international community, manifested in the persistence of international tensions, and in consequence in the feeling of insecurity in spite of the overarming of the whole world, in the increasing level of underdevelopment, the deterioration of the environment, the large-scale and repeated violations of human rights, etc.

A sectoral approach to the problems which beset the world has not proved an adequate basis for understanding all their manifold dimensions. It is accordingly more and more obvious that the solution will have to emerge from an integrated and global view of the interconnection of those problems.

This perception of the increasing interdependence of human activities has, *inter alia*, given a fresh impetus to the search for a possible close organic connection between disarmament and development.

C. The Scientific Approach to the Question: Demonstration of the Interaction between Disarmament and Development

The scientific approach to the question has illuminated the many dimensions of the objective relationship between disarmament and development. Many expert studies have reached the general conclusion that the arms race and military expenditure in general exert a pernicious influence on development, since they compete with development for the natural, financial, human and technological resources available. The limitation and/or curtailment of the arms race and its consequent military expenditure, on the other hand, would release the necessary resources to finance development policies.

The following detailed findings have emerged from these expert studies:

* 1. The arms race and the production of munitions absorb large quantities of natural resources, especially those which are regarded as having strategic importance.

Various scenarios of the construction and deployment of 200 ground-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, for example, require 10,000 tons of aluminium, 2,500 tons of chromium, 150 tons of titanium, 24 tons of beryllium, 890,000 tons of steel and 2,400 tons of cement.

The manufacture of a modern fighter bomber or of a medium-range, ground-to-air missile requires approximately the same quantity of metals irrespective of the country of origin.

To take another example, oil consumption by the defence industry accounts for over 5 per cent of the overall world consumption, and is more than half the combined oil consumption of all developing countries apart from China.

It is therefore clear that the consumption of natural resources on arms production militates against economic and social development.

* 2. Although military research and development provides employment for 25 per cent of the available scientific manpower and absorbs 40 per cent of world expenditure on research and development, its technological spin-off is limited.

* 3. Military programmes have in recent years made a major contribution to the unbalanced state of cash flows and to the situation over external debt.

According to some of the available statistics, 40 per cent of all the debts contracted by the developing countries between 1975 and 1985 were attributable to the importation of arms. There is also a very striking contrast between the assistance granted to developing countries, amounting to about $US 30 billion, and the quantities of arms exported by the rich to the poor countries, which have been estimated to have cost about $US 34 billion. To take just one example, the Gulf War will have cost Iran and Iraq about $US 400 billion in economic and financial terms. Over and above this expenditure, forecasts indicate that the reconstruction of Iraq will take 10 years and that of Iran 20 years.

* 4. The arms race contributes to economic discrimination and impedes the normal circulation of products, techniques, capital and services, especially as regards the sophisticated techniques and raw materials of strategic importance used in the munitions industry. Military rivalry embodies the seeds of tension and of political and economic conflict, to the extent that efforts are made to restrict economic transactions liable to hàve military applications, in order to prevent or forestall an adversary gaining military advantages.

* 5. Military expenditure may cause unbalanced situations, fluctuations and blockages in the world economy, especially by its impact on the scale of investment and the nature of technical innovation, on the balance of trade and the flow of international capital, and on world inflation and indebtedness.

The connection which has been found between disarmament and development also reveals a very striking and worrying disparity between the respective trends in the efforts devoted to armament and disarmament.

Whereas military expenditure rose from about $US 450 billion to $US 1,000 billion during the period from 1978 down to the present, public development aid increased only slightly during the same period and the foreign debts of the developing countries rose sharply from $US 650 billion in 1980 to over $US 1,000 billion today.

Against this background, current estimates indicate that about 1 billion people are living below the poverty threshold, 780 billion are illiterate, 1.5 billion do not have access to medical care and 1 billion do not have adequate accommodation.

The squandering of resources on armaments is alarming when one considers that the release of just a small part of these resources would be sufficient to finance many of the urgent needs in economic and social development.

Some interesting data have emerged in this connection from a recent study carried out by *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987*. Military expenditure throughout the world is now equal to the total income of the 2.6 billion inhabitants of the 44 least advanced countries.

UNESCO has estimated, for example, that only $US 300 million would be needed to immunize all the children in the world against the six main diseases of childhood. This is the amount that the world spends on arms in three hours.

Another statistic which cannot fail to grip the imagination was given in a statement by the Swedish delegation to the meeting of the UNICEF Executive Board in April 1988: the amount spent by the international community in four hours for military purposes equals the whole of the UNICEF budget for two years, i.e. $US 500 million.

The connection which has been established between disarmament and development raises a fundamental question: what must we do to reverse the trend and stop the world from overarming?

PART II: International Recognition of the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and How to Achieve It

International recognition of the relationship between disarmament and development arises through the interplay of two combined and complementary factors: the growing interest devoted to the issue on account of the results of expenditure on armaments and on development, on the one hand, and the emergence and strengthening of a relative international consensus as a result of a better understanding of the interaction between disarmament and development, on the other hand.

In this respect, the holding of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development is significant.

However, it goes without saying that fundamental requirements have to be met in order to make this relationship a reality: political will on the part of States; continuation of the international dialogue on the issue; and adjustment of security policies to development requirements.

A. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development: Ratification and Broadening of the Relationship and Steps for its Achievement

The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, from 24 August to 11 September 1987, represented a historic event of major political significance and was at one and the same time a culmination and a starting point.

First of all, it represented the culmination of intense and sustained efforts which had been under way for many years at the multilateral level to reach the best possible understanding of the full scope of the relationship between disarmament and development.

It also constituted the starting point for a fresh and progressive initiative aimed at strengthening international peace and security and speeding up economic and social progress.

1 - *Ratification of the conclusions of expert studies into the matter and a broadening of the relationship between disarmament and development*

The International Conference ratified, or rather confirmed the relevant conclusions reached by the expert studies carried out at the request of the United Nations into the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditure and into the relationship between disarmament and development. At the same time, the Conference identified a triangular relationship between disarmament, development and security.

While paragraph 2 of the Final Document of the International Conference recognizes that disarmament and development are two of the most urgent challenges facing the world today and that they are two pillars on which enduring international peace and security can be built, paragraph 3 delivers a clear and unequivocal verdict against the arms race and military expenditure:

"The continuing arms race is absorbing far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources, placing a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and affecting the international flow of trade, finance and technology, in addition to hindering the process of confidence-building among States. The global military expenditures are in dramatic contrast to economic and social underdevelopment and to the misery and poverty afflicting more than two thirds of mankind. Thus, there is a commonality of interests in seeking security at lower levels of armaments and finding ways of reducing these expenditures."

Furthermore, the incompatibility between continuing to pursue the arms race and promoting and speeding up economic and social development is highlighted by paragraph 4, which declares:

"The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order; it cannot do both."

In particular, with regard to the relationship between disarmament and development, the International Conference acknowledged its dual nature in the following terms:

- While disarmament and development both strengthen international peace and security and promote prosperity, they are distinct processes;

- Disarmament and development have a close and multidimensional relationship. Each of them can have an impact at the national, regional and global levels in such a way as to create an environment conducive to the promotion of the other.

Furthermore, the International Conference made a fundamental choice when it set disarmament and development within a triangular relationship in which security is an overriding priority for all nations and in which it plays a crucial role.

Although the reference to security to some extent justifies the thesis of many major military Powers that armament expenditure corresponds to security requirements, the Final Document advisedly incorporated essential factors such as:

- The need to implement the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and to seek security at substantially lower levels of armaments;

- The overriding need to overcome military and non-military threats to security.

2 - *Definition of the general framework of action to make the relationship between disarmament and development a reality*

As part of the action programme of the International Conference, States participating agreed to give further consideration:

- To the adoption of measures to reduce the level and magnitude of military expenditures;

- To the utilization of existing regional and international institutions for the reallocation of resources released through disarmament measures for socio-economic development, particularly in developing countries;

- To accord priority to the allocation, within the framework of the United Nations, of part of the resources, including human and technical resources, presently devoted to military purposes for emergency humanitarian relief operations and critical development problems, pending the achievement of genuine disarmament under effective international control.

Furthermore, the General Assembly is requested to keep under periodic review the relationship between disarmament and development in the light of this action programme, in particular at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

It is worthwhile recalling that the adoption of this action programme was the outcome of intense and arduous negotiations or consultations which revealed the reluctance of some developed countries to adopt specific and binding commitments regarding the appropriate ways and means of making the relationship between disarmament and development a reality.

Consequently, the consensus achieved took the form of a preference for defining a general framework of future measures, including, in particular:

- Undertaking studies related to a conversion of military industry to civilian production and identification of the benefits that could be derived from the reallocation of military resources;
- Assessment of their political and security requirements and the level of their military spending, and the nature and volume of resources that may be released through arms limitation and disarmament measures;
- Carrying out regular analyses of the economic and social consequences of military spending and informing the public and the United Nations about them;
- Preparation of an improved and comprehensive data base on global and national military expenditures to facilitate the study and analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the world economy and the international economic system;
- Furtherance, by the United Nations, of collective knowledge of the non-military threats to international security.

Thus, through its action programme, the Conference called for deeper research into the manifold dimensions of the close relationship between disarmament and development.

B. The Requirements for Making the Relationship between Disarmament and Development a Reality

Naturally, the action programme of the International Conference henceforth provides an overall framework for making the relationship between disarmament and development a reality. There are, however, a number of fundamental requirements that must be met for this to be achieved.

On the one hand, in order to strengthen the consensus achieved by the International Conference it is necessary to continue the international dialogue on the manifold dimensions of the relationship between development and disarmament. This entails the simultaneous marshalling of material and financial resources, in particular to allow expert studies to be made, and an in-depth examination of the issue within the relevant United Nations agencies.

Secondly, it is essential that the political will of States to promote development through disarmament should be translated into a reduction in the level of their military expenditure and a corresponding increase in their development aid together with provision, in the disarmament agreements, for mechanisms for allocating the savings thus made.

Finally, in order to make the relationship between disarmament and development a reality it is necessary to reconsider current security concepts in the light of the impossibility of any longer viewing security exclusively in military terms. Non-military threats to security must henceforth be given all the necessary attention.

As you will undoubtedly have realized, the relationship between disarmament and development possesses a long history and is an issue whose importance justifies both the keen interest shown in it by the international community, and the Seminar in which we have the honour of participating. It is vital that we, as Africans, seek ways of utilizing all the analyses that have been made in order to solve the problems of security, disarmament and development.

We have just shown the tangible nature of the links between development, disarmament and security and the need for progress in the field of disarmament in order to enjoy genuine security, without which it is difficult to attain the objective of development. Clearly, each State has a legitimate right to security, with a minimum of armaments. Are then the States of Africa sufficiently overarmed for the issue of disarmament to be broached?

Part III: The African Situation

It is somewhat surprising to broach the subject of disarmament in Africa, in particular in our region of West Africa where there are no munitions factories. However, South Africa is an arms producer on our continent!

The concept of disarmament is primarily analysed in terms of the reduction of military expenditure, which remain fairly high in comparison with the resources of our various countries and with some other regions of the world. This analysis will make it possible to set out the prospects for the future.

A. Analysis of the Situation

A regional breakdown of arms imports (at constant 1985 prices) by the developing countries between 1970 and 1987 is provided below: the figures are in millions of dollars.

Region	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986	1987
Middle East	4,541	8,302	8,483	10,827	10,193	11,546
Southern Asia	1,085	1,112	1,942	3,442	3,974	6,152
Far East	3,069	1,700	3,328	2,612	2,954	2,477
South America	659	1,864	2,275	2,012	1,062	1,939
North Africa	258	1,580	3,507	1,233	1,363	479
Sub-Saharan Africa	260	1,074	1,649	1,563	1,392	1,807
Central America	138	320	467	600	594	316
Total	**10,010**	**15,952**	**21,651**	**22,289**	**21,532**	**24,716**

The data are from the 1988 Yearbook published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

A reduction in the level of military expenditure will make it possible to release resources to support activities for the development of our countries, in respect of which it is necessary to recall a number of economic facts.

Our countries bear a crushing debt burden. The prices of raw materials continue to fall, while those of imported products surge, constantly aggravating the deterioration in the terms of trade. The mortality rate remains highest in our countries, where life expectancy, which averages 47 years, is 20 years shorter than elsewhere. Fifteen to 20 per cent of our children die at birth. Furthermore, our continent is regularly afflicted by natural disasters such as drought, desertification, flooding and locusts, all of which cause serious upsets to the most important sector of our economies, their agriculture. It is regrettable to observe that since the 1970s, the agricultural sector, which accounts for up to 60 per cent of our countries' gross domestic product, has ceased to progress. In that connection, it is tragic that the sector's rate of growth should have fallen to approximately 1.5 per cent, while the annual population growth rate in Africa is in the region of 2.8 per cent. This makes the difficulties encountered by our countries in feeding their populations understandable. We are facing a dramatic paradox: how is it possible for Africa, with all the land it possesses, and with between 70 and 90 per cent of its population living in rural areas, to continue to use its already limited resources to import food, when it could devote those same resources to development programmes if the agricultural sector were to be better managed?

In these critical circumstances it is quite clear that expenditure on arms purchases rather than for the purposes of socio-economic development cannot fail to raise disturbing questions. The fact that the rate of military expenditure in Africa is constantly rising in comparison with the economic growth rate is a source of constant concern. According to some studies, military expenditure in Africa had already reached $US 16.9 billion in 1983, a more than 400 per cent increase over the 1973 figure of 3.8 billion. The share of the Sub-Saharan Region (excluding South Africa) was 9.8 billion. Africa's share of world military expenditure rose from 1.3 per cent in 1973 to 2.1per cent in 1983.

Africa is one of the world regions in which the rate of military expenditure exceeds the growth rate of the gross national product.

A World Bank study has revealed that, with the exception of South Africa, the actual growth rate of military expenditure by African countries was 7.3 per cent between 1973 and 1983, whereas the growth rate of the GNP over the same period was 4.2 per cent.

It should once again be emphasized that, in spite of the burden of military expenditure borne by our countries, the persistent military threats against the security of States and of the region as a whole compel our Governments to continue diverting already limited resources, which should have been devoted to development, to military ends: therein lies the great dilemma facing Africa.

There is no longer any need to demonstrate that all African countries attach considerable importance to peace, security and development. However, although countries recognize that excessive military expenditure might jeopardize those objectives, they argue that they are responsible for defending their territory and their citizens by all possible means, including arms.

Clearly, it is impossible for some countries to remain unmoved by the determination of others to acquire arms. The purpose of disarmament is security, and it will never be possible to guarantee security if some countries give up their weapons while others continue to acquire them.

What prospects does the future hold?

B. Prospects for the Future

If all African countries were to disarm it would contribute to mutual confidence-building, diminish conflicts and tension, facilitate development and thereby contribute towards the construction of a durable peace.

The accumulation of weapons has never been synonymous with security. The facts amply show that, on the contrary, it rather constitutes a threat to security.

The super-Powers provide a perfect illustration of this situation. Although the super-Powers and their allies have so far succeeded in avoiding war, they do not feel any more secure and are capable of continuing to acquire increasingly sophisticated weapons to, so to speak, ensure their security. It is significant that since the Reykjavik summit relations between the super-Powers have made great strides towards the establishment of a climate of peace based on confidence. The USSR had an overriding need to establish a climate of security, thereby allowing it to reduce its military expenditure and to devote the resources thus released to development. By signing and implementing the nuclear weapons agreements, the United States of America and the Soviet Union have demonstrated remarkable political will which should inspire us and stir us into paving the way towards security and prosperity for our continent. In that connection, the various defence and security agreements signed by our heads of State are of major importance. At the third summit of Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Quest (CEDEAO), the President-founder of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* and President of the Togolese Republic, General Gnassingbé Eyadema, declared: "if our scant resources were to be devoted to the arms race in order to ensure the peace and security essential for our development, we would lose our wager and our peoples' future would be jeopardized. Consequently, it is more urgent than ever before for us to realize the danger inherent in this situation and to ward off any threat of conflict among us. In this light, the non-aggression pact which we have proposed to our Nigerian brother takes on its full significance".

These are the words of a visionary who has, furthermore, on several occasions declared that "without peace among African States, it is impossible to undertake any constructive development effort in the region". The major declarations by President Babangida on peace, security and the well-being of the continent's peoples are highly significant, as was his gesture at the beginning of March 1989, when he made a contribution of 15 million CFA francs ($50,000) to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in support of its action. It is also proper to pay tribute to the commitment and resolve of the Government of Togo, which, like Nigeria, spares no effort in striving to transform the Centre into an instrument for promoting peace and security in Africa.

Prospects for peace among independent African States, the guarantee of their security, are encouraging. Those conflicts which have broken out here and there have either been rapidly settled thanks to the desire of all for peace and security or are in the process of being settled. In a region where the bonds of brotherhood are still firm and where there is a heartfelt desire for unity and progress, disarmament is no longer a mere alternative; on the contrary, it constitutes a fundamental and essential requirement. In order to bring it into being, States should have greater trust in one another and implement the agreements they have signed to ensure their security. The Soviets and the Americans have learnt to trust one another. Why should we, as Africans, living on the same continent and condemned to live together, be unable to do so?

Confidence among States would allow the region more effectively to unite its efforts to tackle its common problems such as poverty.

Since the Ministerial Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development held in Lomé in August 1985, OAU has implemented vigorous measures to provide a framework for development and security on the continent, one which would take into account its specific circumstances and the concerns of the other members of the international community.

EAST-WEST EXPERIENCE IN THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY
(FROM HELSINKI TO STOCKHOLM TO VIENNA)

by

Ambassador A. Rossbach
Deputy Commissioner, Arms Control and Disarmament
Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany

I. The CSCE Final Act of Helsinki

Security, human rights and co-operation are the key concepts of the CSCE.

The project of a "European security conference" originally envisaged by the Soviet Union was aimed at the political confirmation and multilateral perpetuation of the territorial and political *status quo* that had emerged in Europe after World War II and at the creation of a collective security system excluding the United States. The expansion of economic co-operation with the West was another important aspect that was subsequently added. During the first phase of détente in the early 1970s, the West took up the project and extended the topics for the conference to include respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, freedom of movement for people, information and ideas as well as cultural relations. At the same time, it was confirmed that borders can be changed by peaceful means and through mutual agreement, thus avoiding a perpetuation of the existing borders in Europe.

The three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act were thus created:

Basket I deals with "Questions relating to security in Europe". This includes above all the catalogue of ten basic principles at the beginning of the Final Act, which incorporates respect for human rights as an element of security and establishes a code of conduct for the States in East and West. In addition, the basket contains the first confidence-building measures in the military sphere.

Basket II concerns "Co-operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environment".

Basket III deals with "Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" (human contacts, information, culture and education).

All in all, the Helsinki Final Act is a new kind of document: For the first time it proved possible to place respect for human rights (principle VII) on a par with other principles of international law. This substantive anchorage of human rights and the provisions in basket III regarding practical measures in the humanitarian domain are the reference basis of the "human dimension" of the CSCE.

The Final Act is both a declaration of principles and a programme of work, since it combines principles and action programmes for the co-existence of States with provisions that are to benefit directly the citizens of those States.

II. From Helsinki to Vienna, or: What is the CSCE process?

The CSCE did not come to an end when the Helsinki Final Act was signed. Instead it laid the foundation and charted the course for the realization of a peaceful order in Europe, as the West had been demanding ever since 1967, in the Atlantic Alliance's Harmel Report. The CSCE is thus a central instrument for the active, political shaping of East-West relations and must therefore be regarded as a process. Within it, countries of different social systems can work together. The CSCE continues those material and intellectual traditions that unite Europe across the borders between the different systems. It supplements the dialogue between the super-Powers by means of a comprehensive range of subjects. The multilateral nature of the CSCE process also enables small and medium-sized participating States in East and West to articulate their interests and put forward their national concerns, irrespective of their membership in a particular military alliance.

The West continues to regard the CSCE process as a framework permitting peaceful change in conditions of stability and co-operation that opens up the different political systems as well as constructive competition.

The elaboration of the Final Act was but the first stage of the CSCE process. The subsequent landmarks were the major CSCE follow-up meetings, which were devoted to fully reviewing the implementation of the commitments voluntarily assumed in the CSCE documents by all participating States and to developing new, more extensive measures and improvements in the key areas of security, co-operation, human rights and human contacts.

Not all meetings have been equally successful. The Belgrade follow-up meeting (1977-78) took place at a time of heightened East- West confrontation. Lasting almost three years, the Madrid conference (1980-83) produced a Concluding Document partly containing new substantive proposals. Through the adoption of a mandate for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the Madrid document paved the way for greater confidence, security and transparency in the military field in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

III. The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament (CDE) in Stockholm

After 34 months of intensive negotiations, the CDE was successfully completed in 1986. As envisaged in the Madrid mandate, the Stockholm Document of 19 September 1986 obliges the 35 CSCE participating States to take concrete measures designed to reduce the risk of armed conflict and avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions in connection with military activities. In particular, prior notification must be given of military exercises of a specific size, and over a certain threshold observers from all participating States are to be invited to them. A decisive step forward in the verification of arms control obligations is the right agreed in Stockholm to on-site inspections without a right of refusal as a means of monitoring the application of the confidence- and security-building measures.

IV. The negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Vienna

The successful completion of the third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna and the adoption of a multi-faceted concluding document at a time when East-West relations are undergoing a dynamic development have set new standards for international relations on our continent. This applies not only to the area of security and disarmament (start of the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and of the negotiations on a further set of confidence- and security-building measures), but above all to the field known as the "human dimension". In Vienna, this field was substantively expanded and improved. In addition, a procedure for controlling and monitoring respect for human rights was established for the first time within the CSCE framework.

(1) CFE negotiations

In security terms, the main result of the Vienna follow-up meeting is the adoption of mandates for negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and on the further development of the Stockholm régime of confidence- and security-building measures. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and its partners in the Western Alliance had for a long time been drawing attention to the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority in Europe as a major cause of the security problem existing in Europe. The Warsaw Pact's ability to launch surprise attacks and initiate large-scale offensive action, i.e., its capability for invasion, particularly affects the Federal Republic of Germany as it is situated at the dividing line between the two alliances. Negotiations aimed at establishing a stable balance of conventional forces in the whole of Europe at lower levels were therefore urgently needed.

The 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, whose potentials determine the military balance in Europe to a decisive extent, take part in the CFE negotiations, which were opened in Vienna from 6 to 8 March 1989 at the conference of foreign ministers of the CSCE participating States. The main objective of the negotiations is to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels and to eliminate, as a matter of priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. This is to be achieved above all by means of reductions, ceilings for specific weapon systems and other stabilizing measures. The principal elements of the detailed Western proposal tabled at the beginning of the negotiations are:

1. Concentration on those weapon systems which, due to their mobility and firepower, are central to the capability for launching surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive action: main battle tanks, artillery pieces and armoured troop carriers. Both throughout Europe and regionally, they are to be reduced to equal ceilings below the level of the weaker side.

2. Limitation of forces stationed outside one's own territory ("stationing rule") as well as restriction of an individual State's potential

to at most 30% of the overall potential of all participating States ("sufficiency rule").

3. Annual exchange of information on equipment holdings and manpower strengths, the duty to give notification of any changes and supplementary stabilizing measures. Effective verification,not least through on-site inspections without a right of refusal, is indispensable.

In the longer term, further reductions, the inclusion of additional weapon categories and the restructuring of forces according to defensive criteria are envisaged.

The "framework concept" presented by the East, which was given further substance during the first two rounds of negotiations, coincides with Western ideas in numerous respects. The concept envisages the elimination of existing disparities in respect of combat aircraft, combat helicopters, main battle tanks, artillery pieces, armoured troop carriers and personnel as well as the establishment of equal ceilings that are 10 to 15% below the existing level of the weaker side. In the longer run, further reductions by 25% and a general adaptation to defensive structures are advocated.

The first two rounds of negotiations held on the basis of these two concepts were marked by an intensive, businesslike constructive dialogue, in the course of which areas of common ground between both sides' ideas became apparent. Consensus was achieved above all on a phased approach to the priority goal of eliminating the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action, on the concept of ceilings below the level of the weaker side, on the principle of stationing and sufficiency rules, on the rejection of unproductive data discussions and on the demand for a reliable verification system and further stabilizing measures. Controversial issues were, in particular, the Eastern demands that combat aircraft be included in the first CFE treaty, that ceilings be established for personnel as well, that thinned-out areas be created along the line of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and that there be regional differentiation within Europe.

For the sake of expediting the negotiations, the West decided at the NATO summit in Brussels on 29-30 May to add numerous elements to its negotiating proposal. The new Western concept was officially tabled in Vienna at the end of the second round. It envisages above all, as a concession to the East, the inclusion of airplanes and helicopters in the negotiations at this stage as well as agreement on a ceiling for U.S. and Soviet stationed troops.

After two rounds of negotiations, a far greater degree of progress and conceptual agreement has been achieved at the CFE negotiations than at any previous arms control talks. It has become clear that everyone involved is interested in achieving swift and substantive results. Despite differences of opinion that persist, there are good prospects of successfully completing the negotiations by mid-1990. Such a successful outcome would have far-reaching consequences for Europe's future development above and beyond the security sector.

(2) CSBM negotiations

The negotiations on a further set of confidence- and security-building measures, in which – as in Stockholm – the neutral and non-aligned States of Europe are also participating, are being held parallel to the CFE negotiations, having likewise been started at Vienna in March 1989. In this forum, too, there is a large measure of consensus on improving and expanding the Stockholm package of measures. The main basis of the negotiations is the Western proposal for a comprehensive exchange of information on the organization, structure and size of armed forces and on plans to introduce new weapons into the forces, for the enhancement of the notification régime, for improvements relating to the observation of military activities and for better means of guaranteeing compliance and verification. The Eastern package of proposals shows that the Warsaw Pact countries have largely adopted the Western concept of transparency and confidence-building and are trying to develop it further to the benefit of their own security interests. A moot point is in particular the Eastern demand that independent naval activities be included, which the West considers to lie outside the scope of the mandate. An important innovation compared with Stockholm is the exchange of views on security concepts and military doctrines in respect of the potentials actually in existence.

EAST-WEST EXPERIENCE IN THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

(from Helsinki to Stockholm to Vienna)

by

Yuriy Derlabin
Chief, Department for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Moscow, USSR

I am glad to have this opportunity to share with you the approach of the Soviet Union to the European process, to state some of our considerations on its development and prospects based on the rich experience of our involvement in this process of truly immense importance.

The Helsinki process is not just one of the priority directions in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. We view this process as providing good opportunities for promoting new political thinking: not just in Europe but on the other continents of our interrelated world as well. The collective experience gained in the European process undoubtedly deserves close study and thinking over, no matter how different all specific conditions in other regions may be. I believe that this opinion will also be shared by the other participants in the seminar.

The Final Act adopted nearly 14 years ago in Helsinki has embodied Europe's collective experience after two world wars and the cold war period. It reflects the political will of States and peoples to improve and reinvigorate their relations, to promote peace in Europe. Historically, the adoption of this document symbolized continuity of the main trends in the European and world development which resulted from WW II.

Summing up the political outcome of the war, the Final Act has built on the principles formulated in Yalta, Potsdam and in the UN Charter, applying them to new conditions.

Thirty-three European States, the US and Canada jointly reaffirmed the futility of the position-of-strength policy and of the cold war. They proclaimed new democratic principles of communications between States – the Helsinki decalogue – which certainly have also universal value.

These principles include sovereign equality and respect for rights intrinsic to sovereignty. They also include respect for people's right to choose freely and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems.

No less valid today – and not just for Europe – are principles such as non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of borders, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny for themselves.

Now that attention is focused, as never before, on the question of respect for human rights and freedoms, of legal and social protection of man, it would be appropriate to remind you how precisely this principle is formulated in the Helsinki decalogue. And here we mean the entire complex of civil, political, economic and other rights and freedoms ensuing from the dignity inherent in the individual rather than the priority of some particular rights.

The Helsinki Act was ahead of its time in many respects. It incorporates practically all parameters of security – political, military, economic and humanitarian. It also reflects the idea of simultaneous and balanced advancement in all these area. In other words, the idea of comprehensive international security and peace, now approved by the UN, is based on the experience of the European process as well.

For Europeans today, there is no political alternative to this process. It provides one of the most realistic ways, I would even say, catalysts, for the positive changes in East-West relations, for lowering the level of military confrontation, and for building confidence and broad co-operation.

Europe – with all its recognized civility in the conduct of political affairs – has never known such a well-managed dialogue among practically all nations of the continent and the US and Canada, which share their history, traditions and interests. This dialogue can only be productive given a carefully weighted balance of interests of its participants.

Neither European nor world history has ever witnessed such a democratic process. All countries – large, medium and small, both participating in military and political alliances and neutral or non-aligned –

have equal standing, each can have an equal say on any matter. This equality is guaranteed by the consensus principle. There is no place – or, rather, there should be no place – for bloc ambitions or approaches here. The Helsinki process has shown in a new light the role and abilities of neutral and non-aligned countries. Successes achieved between Helsinki and Vienna are largely a result of the active role played by precisely those countries.

By placing political means of dispute settlement in the forefront of relations between States, the Helsinki process reduces the chances of reverting to a situation where such problems are settled by the force of arms. And this is its main achievement. In essence it represents the principle of peaceful coexistence in action embracing an entire continent. This principle is not only implemented, it is getting filled with a new content. West Europe is adapting itself to East Europe, we are adapting ourselves to West Europe and together, within the framework of the Helsinki process, we are adapting to the idea of supremacy of universal human interests.

The school of Helsinki helps us overcome obsolete stereotypes, gradually master the difficult art of knowing, understanding and trusting each other better. It teaches us to take seriously, rather than arrogantly ignore, the national interests and peculiarities of each other, to find common political denominators. In other words, it helps us see partners rather than enemies in each other.

Certainly, the Helsinki process is not a smooth one. Being ahead of its time in many respects, it advanced unevenly. The ups and downs of the political situation in the world in general as well as in individual countries all made their impact upon this process, sometimes slowing it down dramatically. However, prevailing throughout the Helsinki process has been the common understanding that despite all differences of policy or disagreements as to the causes of any particular state of international relations, the participants are able to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements and to find a balance of interests. It is for this reason that today the Helsinki process has to its credit not only the Final Act but also the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents, that substantially develop and promote the European process.

The Madrid meeting launched the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament. For the first time in many years, the 35 States belonging to different social and political systems and, indeed, to different military and political alliances, were able to arrive at meaningful agreements on important problems of security and confidence in the military field: on advance notifications of military exercises, movements and redeployments of troops, on exchanging annual calendars of military activities, on inviting observers. Here the difficult matter of on-site inspections was settled for the first time, which helped resolve the key problem of verification in the context of the Soviet-US Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles in Europe.

The outcome of the Vienna meeting that finished its work two and a half months ago is justly regarded as the most important event next to Helsinki in post-war Europe.

The response of the international public opinion, of statesmen and politicians is consonant with the political assessment of the meeting given by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who characterized it as elevating the Helsinki process to a new level in all fields, as an unprecedented event not just for Europe but for the world as a whole. Particular mention was made of the fact that without *perestroika* under way in the USSR, without the new approaches to internal and international affairs, the success of the Vienna meeting would have been impossible. This success is directly associated with the UN address by Mikhail S. Gorbachev of 7 December 1988.

Success reached in Vienna crowned the process of humanization of European relations and international relations as a whole. The ancient truth realized by the forerunners of humanism at the very dawn of civilization – that the human being is the measure of all things – is becoming the supreme moral imperative of our time.

Vienna was a success because we were able to move beyond futile debates about whose system is better or whose ideology is more correct and concentrate on the real needs of the Europeans, that is, on building a decent and safe life for them. Viewing the Vienna decisions on all three baskets from this angle, they have one common denominator – supremacy of human interests. This is what victory in Vienna is all about, speaking in broader terms.

Certainly, this was not an easy achievement. At one time the participants, if not separated by a chasm, were far apart on the issues. The distance between them was overcome through honest and courageous efforts of all without any exception on the basis of a thoroughly weighted balance of interests.

Those are not just sprouts but rather fruits of the new thinking grown in European soil. Certainly, it is difficult and sometimes even painful to cultivate them. In reaching agreement everyone had to sacrifice something. But in fact each gained more in return. This is the essence of the Helsinki process.

One of the main results of the Vienna meeting was the decision to start negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe involving the 23 Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO States and concurrent negotiations on further security and confidence-building measures in Europe among the 35 States participating in the CSCE. It is fundamentally important that both negotiations which began in March 1989 take place within the CSCE framework and are closely linked. This significantly bolsters the military and political dimension of the European process. It is now possible to take real steps to bring down the level of military controntation on the European continent.

The new Vienna negotiations have begun in the propitious climate of changes in the military and political situation on the continent and in the world in general.

For the first time Europe has seen real reductions in nuclear armaments. Two categories of such arms are being eliminated by one stroke under strict mutual control. The INF Treaty was a turning point in strengthening European security. The Paris Conference has significantly promoted progress towards the elimination of chemical weapons in the near future.

Our decision to go ahead with major reductions in our armed forces by 500,000, to withdraw from the Soviet armed forces in Europe 240,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 800 combat aircraft, to reduce tactical nuclear systems, and change the structure of the remaining units was a radical breakthrough to the principle of defence sufficiency.

This was a voluntary concrete step we have taken, introducing *perestroika* into military inter-State relations. This was a unilateral step where deeds preceded words and where our intentions preceded future multilateral agreements. We believe that it would be appropriate for our Western partners as well to think over this "diplomacy of example" which was joined in by our Warsaw Treaty allies.

The negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe address all categories of such arms without exception, whether or not they possess any additional capabilities. Therefore, the so called "dual capable systems" (artillery, tactical attack aircraft, tactical missiles capable of using nuclear warheads as well) are also subject to discussion and reduction.

The geographical scope of negotiations is also unprecedented; they cover territories from the Atlantic to the Urals, including the greater part of Turkey, all European insular territories of the participants as well as remote islands such as the Canaries, the Azores, Madeira, the Franz Josef Land, Spitsbergen, Novaya Zemlya.

Now Europe is in fact open to deep reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, to the changes in their structure and location, and to the establishment on the continent of a balance at reduced levels where both sides would retain only those forces and armaments which are necessary for defence and insufficient for a surprise attack or offensive operations.

In post-war decades every State or every military and political alliance sought security through unilateral military efforts, by building for themselves a certain "security margin", excessive more often than not, in an attempt to ward off an actual or perceived external threat. This has never been a rational way. Today it is simply unacceptable. An advantage in armaments can never be permanent.

In the modern world, the threat to others is at the same time the threat to oneself. The only correct solution of the security equation is creating a situation where the armed forces of a State or alliance not only do not threaten others, but cannot objectively be perceived as a threatening factor.

Our position and that of our allies was announced long ago. It is a three-stage reduction of armed forces in Europe to the levels sufficient solely for defence, including a 10 to 15 per cent reduction from lower levels in the first stage. NATO has recently put forward a proposal on stability at reduced levels of armaments.

Can these two approaches be bridged? I believe they can. Despite serious differences there is a certain convergence between the positions of the sides. Both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty seek to eliminate the existing asymmetries and imbalances through the reduction in the first place of armed forces and armaments which are capable of being used in a surprise attack or large-scale offensive operations.

This in itself constitutes good groundwork for the negotiations in Vienna. If the sides manage to focus their work precisely on this group of armaments, it would be possible on this basis to produce the first set of agreements.

The transition to stability and reduced levels of armaments also puts the question of tactical nuclear weapons in a new perspective. We are confident that the negotiations on the reduction and ultimate elimination of such weapons are inevitable.

Today one can hardly perceive the European security equation which would leave out nuclear weapons. The military capability of both alliances is based on the combination of conventional and nuclear systems. Therefore a disarmament scenario where troops and conventional armaments are reduced while missiles equipped with nuclear warheads are left at their sites would be a piece of surrealistic art.

This would enhance the role of the nuclear factor in the European military balance and increase the chance of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict situation.

As you certainly know, we do not believe that the theory of nuclear deterrence is all that infallible. Nor can we deny that nuclear weapons had a role to play in preventing another war in Europe.

However, you are also aware that our programme of 15 January 1986 for a nuclear-free world takes into account these considerations, voiced in particular by those whose nuclear potential is relatively small. Never have we proposed to denuclearize Europe at one stroke.

Nevertheless, we are convinced that nuclear weapons should keep withering away. They are a political and military atavism.

We are entering the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe with a heightened sense of responsibility. Negotiations involving all 35 participants in the Helsinki process are the continuation of the Stockholm conference. The disarmament-confidence-security triad reflects the essence of the military and political dimension of the European process.

The purpose of our proposal to create a military-risk-reduction and surprise-attack-prevention centre in Europe is to accelerate confidence-building in the military field.

We hope that this proposal will be thoroughly discussed.

What with all its prospective military, technical, and information functions, that centre would have a great political and, which is no less important, psychological significance as a backbone of a qualitatively new system of interaction among 35 States of the Helsinki process. In the Europe of openness, it would serve as a component of an extensive and dependable infrastructure of confidence in Europe and, in the longer term, elsewhere.

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We regard limitation of military activities in terms of scope and types as a priority aspect of confidence-building. Indeed, if the sides declare that they do not intend to attack one another, this automatically renders redundant many types of military exercises. For instance, why try out large-scale offensive operations once the sides have agreed that capabilities to conduct such operations should be dismantled?

We believe that limitation and notification measures adopted in Stockholm could be carried even further both in rigour and scope. This would result in drastic limitation and, ideally, elimination of activities which may be perceived as threatening.

Working under the Vienna mandate we do not intend to forget the Madrid mandate. It says that confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and airspace (including the adjoining ocean areas).

Generally speaking, the problem of naval armaments is increasingly coming into prominence. After all, the truth cannot be denied that these armaments have a significant offensive potential. They are capable of conducting independent operations to seize territory and they can rapidly create and reinforce a powerful offensive formation on the seized part of a shoreline.

We are confident that an objective analysis of the situation, which will evolve as cuts in conventional armed forces are implemented, will reveal the need to discuss naval forces at a relevant negotiation.

Given the novelty, wide scope and complexity of the negotiations that have started in Vienna – and precisely because of this – we deem it particularly important to lend momentum to them and make them dynamic.

The experience of recent years shows that the most dramatic breakthroughs in resolving acute international problems, including those in the reduction of military confrontation, can be achieved at summit meetings of world leaders. And that is only natural.

They enjoy full authority, have the broadest vision of the world and therefore can provide the necessary impetus to the search for agreements, no matter how complex they may be.

Based on this very assumption, the Soviet Union has proposed that a meeting be held of the leaders of European countries, the United States and Canada. France too has some considerations on this matter. They do not conflict but rather complement each other. There is a growing common understanding that Europe is in great need of such meetings because no individual country or even group of countries can resolve problems facing the whole of the continent, be they military or economic, ecological or humanitarian. We need to ponder together over the historical fate of Europe, the guidelines for its development, difficulties and prospects of the fundamental processes which are under way in it, and what is particularly important, over the prospects of the continent's participation in the life of the world community.

One of the centerpieces of the Vienna Concluding Document is the "human dimension" concept on the basis of which an appropriate mechanism is being created not only for bilateral but also for multilateral co-operation and consultations. This concept underlies a number of specific agreements in the area of human rights and the humanitarian sphere.

Laid down for the first time in the Helsinki process was the right of anyone to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country (with due regard for the restrictions allowed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); the right of an individual to monitor the implementation of CSCE agreements and to associate with others for this purpose; the need to establish strictly warranted time limits on travel for reasons of secrecy. Questions concerning religious activities as well as information are treated in a new way. These include the right to choose freely one's own sources of information and to receive, possess, reproduce and disseminate information materials of any kind.

Decisions of the Vienna meeting provide for publication within a year of all laws and statutory regulations of the participating States relating to movement on their territory and travel between States. Within six months all pending applications for exit should be considered with a view to finding an appropriate solution.

The Vienna Document reaffirms the right of each State to choose freely and develop its political, economic, social and cultural system and to establish its laws and regulations. This document records the obligation to respect national legislation of the participating States but at the same time – and it is of fundamental importance – it notes the need to bring them into conformity with relevant international obligations.

The Vienna accords in the humanitarian and legal sphere go along the lines of measures which have been undertaken or are being undertaken in the Soviet Union as part of *perestroika* and a consistent policy of democratization and *glasnost.* In addition to enriching the all-European process, these accords also reinforce our domestic transformations. This graphically shows the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policies.

The decision to hold a humanitarian conference in Moscow in 1991 reflects the international recognition of the fact that our transformations are real. Together with similar meetings in Paris (1989) and Copenhagen (1990), the Moscow meeting will represent a new feature in the all-European process – the Conference on the Human Dimension.

Under the Vienna guidelines we are also to impart a new quality to co-operation in the "second basket". The participating States will make efforts to further reduce and gradually remove all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade, expansion of industrial co-operation and to the operations of joint ventures. The programme of joint action has been drawn up to control pollution of the air, internal waters and seas, to protect flora and fauna, preserve the ozone layer and to study the phenomenon of the global warming-up of the climate. A conference on economic co-operation to be held in Bonn in 1990 will contribute to a more vigorous trade and industrial co-operation. Urgent problems of environmental protection are to be discussed at a meeting in Sofia in 1989.

In all, the platform agreed upon in Vienna for the development of the all-European process to cover the period up to the next CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1992, provides for 11 all-European meetings.

The main thing now is to maintain the momentum of the Helsinki process created by the Vienna accords and to agument this momentum by practical measures to ensure the implementation by all participants of their obligations under the Vienna Concluding Document.

While insisting on full implementation by all participating States of all commitments and agreements recorded in the Vienna Concluding Document, the Soviet Union for its part will observe them without any exception. Having considered on 24 January 1989, the results of the Vienna meeting at the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee recommended to Soviet ministries and agencies concerned to proceed without delay to the practical implementation of the Vienna agreements in view of the fact that they entered into force as of the day of their adoption. Concurrently, a great deal of work is being done to bring Soviet legislation, rules and regulations into full conformity with the commitments assumed by the Soviet Union under the Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting.

For centuries, Europe was the focal point of inherently contradictory processes whose repercussions went far beyond its geographical borders. The horrible years that Europe lived through also turned into tragedy for all mankind. But on the other hand this same continent gave to the world the ideas of humanism, liberty, equality and fraternity.

It was Europe that gave birth to what we call universal human interests, and it is here that the awareness of their supremacy over everything that divides and alienates is growing.

Today Europe brings its pace into step with rapid international developments, with the realities and growing needs of the interrelated and interdependent world.

Today our continent is on the verge of its political and moral renaissance. It is about to perform its mission as both a unified and unifying factor.

Today the pendulum of political relations is swinging away from confrontation. There are growing signs of the intrinsically optimistic conviction that the situation of total confrontation and mutual mistrust that prevailed yesterday does not correspond to the new trends in Europe's historical development.

European society is increasingly striving for closer ties and joint creative work, seeking to remove mistrust dating back to the time of the cold war.

How should we proceed in pursuit of this goal? It is our conviction that this could be achieved by consolidating the foundation of all-European co-operation, created in Helsinki, by purposefully and consistently overcoming the continuing disunity among Europeans and by overcoming the inertia of bloc thinking and closed mindedness in the military-political, economic and humanitarian activities of States.

This, however, does not imply renunciation of time-tested mechanisms for co-operation either in West or in East Europe or their replacement with some abstract structures. On the contrary, our goal is to take into account as much as possible the actual processes in Europe in the interests of building the "common European home". This is what guided us in establishing relations with the European Community and developing political dialogue and economic co-operation with it.

All this is the manifestation of new thinking which opens up unprecedented opportunities for an effective interaction between the two systems and for fully unharnessing and integrating the existing vast intellectual, moral, and humanitarian potentials, as well as economic, technical and other resources that exist both in the East and in the West. The interaction between the two systems will make it possible for the continent not only to preserve its image but to play an increasingly important role in world affairs and to exercise genuinely peace-making influence on them.

One might ask whether this would lead to the isolation of Europe from the rest of the world, to preoccupation with one's own problems and to the growth of Eurocentrist trends. I think this would lead to something quite different. Whether we want it or not, all economic structures will develop and differences between them and inside them will be overcome only through shaping an integrated world market. It is this trend that determines the prospects of human civilization.

Among other things, this means that it is in the interests of the developed countries themselves, including those in Europe, to ensure progress of the world economy as a whole and to preclude disproportions in its development which could lead to dangerous tensions in world economic ties and even to their disruption.

This future role of Europe is in full harmony with the interests of the third world nations, particularly as regards the resolution of problems they face, such as famine, disease and debt. The extent of our success here in Europe, both in meeting the material and intellectual needs of the individual and in resolving economic and ecological problems, will help to accomplish similar tasks confronting other countries and regions.

AFRICAN STATES: REDUCING TENSION AND ACHIEVING SECURITY IN THE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

by

Dr. Sam Chime
Director of Research
National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
Nigeria

Introduction

The South Atlantic zone has been the subject of flurried activity in United Nations circles since October 1986. At the forty-first session in that year, Brazil introduced a draft resolution on the zone, following which the General Assembly solemnly declared the South Atlantic a "zone of peace and co-operation". That event marked the culmination of long-standing endeavours to set up institutions and modalities for reducing super-Power tension in the zone and to reconstruct habits of peaceful intercourse based on age-long affinities between Africa and South America. Despite this remarkable and epoch-making development, sources of tension still abound in the zone and the task before the international community is to now find the resolve and means to give full support to the ongoing attempts to reduce tension and maximize security and co-operation in the area.

Background

The United Nations documents describe the South Atlantic zone simply as "the region situated between Africa and South America". 1/ On the map, the region lies just below the North Atlantic in the Atlantic Ocean, covering the area roughly between 20 degrees and 65 degrees latitute and between 20 degrees and 60 degrees longitude. But it is evident that more work needs to be done to delimit the area more closely. At the debates on the zone at the forty-third session of the General Assembly in 1988, the Portuguese delegate, Jose Caetano da Costa Pereira decried what he called "the deficient geographical delimitation of the area under consideration". The honourable Portuguese

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1/ General Assembly Resolution 43/23 of 14 November 1988.

delegate would have found it difficult to convince his colleagues that Portugal, squarely in the North Atlantic area, belonged to the South Atlantic. But there are other countries such as Mauritania, on the fringe of the zone, whose continued exclusion would be hard to justify. Similarly, the inclusion of certain Caribbean States can be argued given their historical, social and economic affinities with the countries of Africa and South America. The burgeoning institutions of the zone should make it a priority task to delimit the zone, giving adequate consideration not only to geographical factors, but also to relevant economic and social indices, especially to countries on the fringe of the core area.

The South Atlantic area also comprises, apart from the identifiable littoral States, numerous islands such as the Falklands, Ascension, Gough, South Georgia, South Orkney, South Sandwich, Tristan da Cunha and the South Shetland Islands. It is also evident that the significance of the zone ramifies even into regions that are not immediately on the coastline. The strategic, economic and social parameters which affect the fortunes of the littoral States also have definite impact on most States in the African and South American continents. For that reason, the work of delimiting the zone should also consider the wider implications of this aspect.

At any rate, the following littoral States who co-sponsored the resolution setting up the zone may well be considered the core States of the zone: Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo,Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uruguay, Zaire.

Following the 1986 declaration, the Secretary-General of the United Nations put before the General Assembly, in November, 1987, a report entitled "Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic". 2/ A debate followed and a resolution was adopted subsequently, the operative part of which reads as follows:

The General Assembly

"1. *Commends* the efforts undertaken by States of the zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic to promote peace and regional co-operation pursuant to resolution 41/11, as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General;

2/ See A/42/557 and Corr. 1 and 2, 1987

"2. *Urges* the States of the region to continue their actions aiming at fulfilling the goals of the declaration of the zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic, in particular through the adoption and carrying out of concrete programmes to that end;

"3. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General;

"4. *Calls upon* all States to co-operate in the promotion of the objectives of the zone;

"5. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action inconsistent with the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations and which may create or aggravate situations of tension and potential conflict in the region;

6". *Requests* the relevant organizations, organs and bodies of the United Nations system to render all necessary assistance that the States of the region may seek in their joint endeavours to implement the declaration of the zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic;

"7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to keep the implementation of resolution 41/11 under review and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session, taking into account the views expressed by Member States as well as information from other sources;

"8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic."

Before the forty-third session opened, the member States of the zone organized a conference in Rio de Janeiro, in July 1988. At this Conference they decided on the following:

(i) to recognize the common identity, affinities, and the close similarity of the problems of the countries of the zone;

(ii) to promote regional co-operation;

(iii) to promote intra-zonal trade;

(iv) to improve on intra-zonal transportation and communication;

(v) to enhance generally their material and intellectual exchanges;

(vi) to work to enhance scientific knowledge of the environment and resources of the zone;

(vii) to work to prevent the dumping of hazardous wastes in the area, including toxic and nuclear wastes (in this respect they agreed to set up a "dump watch").

The Conference also condemned the continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa and looked forward to a day when a South Africa, free from the obnoxious system of *apartheid*, would be able to join the other member States of the South Atlantic zone.

The idea of the South Atlantic zone of peace and co-operation has so far received the overwhelming support of all but a few Member States of the United Nations. At the end of the debate on the zone at its forty-third session, 1988, the General Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the holding of the first meeting of States of the zone at Rio de Janeiro and requested the relevant organizations of the United Nations system to render all necessary assistance those States might seek in their efforts to implement the 1986 Declaration on the zone.

Of the five nations recorded as *absent* from those debates, only one – Malawi – was an African country. The others were Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada and Vanuatu. Six Western European nations abstained, namely, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. They were joined by Japan. One hundred and forty-four nations voted in favour. Only one – the United States – voted against.

After the vote the United States delegate, Patricia M. Byrne, sought to explain why her Government voted against. She was of the opinion that the resolution "would be inconsistent with the generally recognized principles under international law of the freedom of navigation of the high seas and the right of innocent passage through territorial waters". It is worthy of note that the delegate for Spain, Rafael Spottorno, advanced a diametrically opposite assessment in explanation of his country's affirmative vote. He stressed that "the text implied *no change*, (emphasis added) in international maritime law".

The United States delegate was also of the opinion that "any attempt to establish an internationally recognized zone of peace should be accomplished through multilateral negotiation among relevant parties, rather than through a General Assembly resolution". To begin with, the present United States view constitutes a *volte-face* in the light of the fact that the same Government had supported earlier General Assembly resolutions declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The United States position was not without its tinge of irony: In effect, the next issue before the General Assembly, after the vote on the South Atlantic, was Namibia – a State within the zone whose tribulations had been the subject of the Rio de Janeiro meeting and were now exercising the General Assembly. One must conclude, on the showing of the latest United Nations debates and vote on the zone, that in the face of United States and European resistance, the international path to a South Atlantic zone of peace and co-operation will not be strewn with roses.

The Significance of the South Atlantic Zone

From the standpoint of the super-Powers and other middle-size Powers, the South Atlantic zone commands a supremely important strategic position. The sea lanes from that zone lead directly from the United States and Western Europe round the Cape of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf from whence are transported the vital supplies of oil that nourish United States and European energy needs. Other strategic and costly mineral resources which flow through those lanes from South Africa include chromium, diamonds, gold, manganese, platinum, uranium and vanadium.

Furthermore, the Western Powers maintain a number of bases in the zone — notably Ascension and St. Helena. Not so long ago, the United Kingdom fought a war against Argentina over the ownership of the Falkland Islands. In the defence perspective of the Western Powers, as well as of the USSR, the control of the sea lanes of the South Atlantic impinge decisively on the viability of their presence in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. Accordingly, both strive to avail themselves of, or deny to their rival, whatever they can control in the area.

The member States of the region are equally dependent on the zone for their strategic and economic well-being. They nourish their economies exporting raw materials and importing finished goods through the sea lanes of the zone. In addition, the resources of the sea are not only of vital importance at present to their ravished economies, but constitute one of the few potential sources of remedy for their food problems. They are also greatly threatened by the high degree of marine pollution and toxic waste due, in part, to the strategic rivalry of the Powers in the zone.

Individual countries of the zone have vital vested interests which impinge on their control of the South Atlantic waters. The area of the zone immediately south of Nigeria has been described as the soft underbelly of Nigeria. Historically, the area is known to have provided the island base from which the British colonizers launched their war of occupation. Nigeria's offshore oil resources, which account for a considerable part of her foreign exchange earnings, lie wholly in this area. Nigeria is almost entirely dependent on the zone for the supply of her imports and the export of raw materials. Other African countries have also occasionally been jolted into full realization of the strategic importance of the zone – as witnessed by the attempted invasion of Benin Republic by the sea only a few years ago.

By far the greatest reminder for Africans of the importance of the South Atlantic is the enormous building up, in recent times, of the South African navy. We now witness the beginnings of a marauding fleet seeking outposts in remote locations from where it can launch devastating attacks on the shores of States regarded as enemies. The dumping of hazardous wastes, toxic and nuclear, on the shores of these countries is yet another ugly aspect of a scary prospect. Brazil, a growing maritime nation, has grasped the full measure of the importance of the South Atlantic. At the 1987 Rio de Janeiro Conference, the Brazilian Minister of External Relations declared: "I even say that we could not define ourselves as a nation without due regard to the sea."

Sources of Tension

The three main sources of tension in the zone are: (i) big-Power rivalry; (ii) the aggressive activities of South Africa; and (iii) instability within the member States of the zone.

Big-Power rivalry encourages the setting up of bases and presence (e.g., the Western Powers in Ascension, St. Helena, etc. and the USSR in Conakry and Angola). There is also a continuous attempt to establish client States, who in their turn, develop rivalries with neighbours who happen not to be in the same camp. Indirectly, this encourages increased defence spending with its negative implications for development due to diversion of vital funds towards arms purchase.

Under the prevailing circumstances, perhaps the greatest source of tension in the zone is South African aggression. By enormously increasing her total arms production, expanding her navy far beyond her legitimate defence needs and even developing a nuclear capability, South Africa has vastly escalated the arms race in the zone. To add to this, South Africa has made it almost a routine to strike militarily into her neighbours' territories and her recent attempt to set up an outpost close to Nigeria demonstrates her willingness to increase tension over the entire zone. What makes the situation even more serious is the fact that South Africa has so far refused to sign the non-proliferation Treaty, thereby making her intentions highly suspect.

As for the member States of the zone, who all belong to the so-called third world, instability is second nature. With depressed economies, excruciating debt burdens, weak political institutions and oftentimes corrupt leadership, they brook social cleavages which frequently erupt into violence. Tensions within and between them and their neighbours render them easy prey to Powers who wish to sell arms or pay to set up military bases. Sometimes the proliferation of unbending ideologies compounds the issue.

Reducing Tension and Achieving Security

If indeed big-Power rivalry lies at the root of tension in the zone, it follows that among the first prerequisites for reducing tension in the area is the scaling down of super-Power rivalry and militarization in the zone. It is for this reason that the quest for a zone of peace and co-operation is seen as only a first phase towards achieving a nuclear-free zone, and in the end, disarmament in the zone. The member States of the zone, by comparison with the big Powers, are not big spenders on arms, neither do they belong to the big manufacturers or exporters of arms, with the possible exception of Brazil. Their ideological and strategic rivalries have not attained a global scale. As a consequence, if it were possible to drastically reduce or eliminate big-Power rivalry in the zone, peace and security would be vastly enhanced.

The problem of South Africa is tightly intertwined with the preoccupations of the big Powers. For it is largely on account of the strategic and economic priorities of those Powers that South Africa remains so important in their view that they find it difficult to decisively curb its aggressive tendencies. The strategic position of the Cape, the overwhelming fear of communism and Soviet influence, the desire to control the strategic minerals of the zone – these various considerations inform the continued unwillingness of the Western Powers to dissociate themselves from South Africa. And yet, as long as South Africa continues to brazenly violate the rights of her citizens and neighbours, as a matter of doctrine, so long will the zone continue to be infused with mistrust, rancour and violence. A basic prerequisite for peace and security in the zone is the ending of the South African *apartheid* nightmare.

The present apparent détente in relations between the United States and the USSR has given hope that the two Powers, rather than work at cross-purposes, will pool their considerable influence to find a commonly acceptable solution to the southern African problem. It is equally to be hoped that the new-found understanding between them will never degenerate into a formula for collusion, under which the interests of the member States of the South Atlantic zone will be relegated to oblivion.

The member States of the zone must continue to foster the institutions which advance co-operation among them. African regional organizations such as the OAU and ECOWAS have a relevant and vital role to play in this respect. The habits of peace, peaceful resolution of conflicts, economic and social co-operation and intellectual exchange must be consistently encouraged. But here again extraneous forces must not be allowed to intervene and render such institutions centres for rivalry. Such a state of affairs has often threatened whenever, for example, former colonial Powers have been allowed to intervene in indigenous attempts to foster regional co-operation.

As for the individual countries, the quest for political maturity of institutions and men must continue. Peace and security cannot finally reign in the zone if the components are in disorder.

The South Atlantic zone of peace and co-operation, as an idea, is a culmination of the efforts to bring Africa and South America together. Among the various confidence-building measures needed to bring this about must be a determined attempt to better the lot of the African diaspora in the Latin American countries on the basis of equity and fair play. This is perhaps the single most potent source of mistrust in the venture. By the same token, any vestiges of the erstwhile collusion between South Africa and some member States of the zone (e.g., Brazil and Argentina) must be removed and seen to be removed. The present public utterances of Brazil and Argentina give cause for hope, but there are still vast areas in the practical intercourse between them and South Africa which show that their willingness to embark on sanctions and boycott South Africa leaves a lot to be desired.

One of the ways to promote co-operation and development is through trade, and the commitment of the members of the zone to increase intra-zonal trade is commendable. But care must be taken that this is done in an equitable manner in view of the present disparities between the level of development of certain South American countries and their African counterpart.

As with trade, so with the military aspect. The disparities in stages of development in that respect must be used to foster general development and co-operation and not domination. More than that, African States should strive to be viable within the limits of their legitimate defence needs. The needs for a zone of peace must incorporate basic security needs. African States would be doing themselves a great disservice if they ended up as a conglomeration of innocents in military matters. Stability in the region would also suffer. By the same token, those of them who can must foster knowledge and competence in the *peaceful* use of nuclear energy.

The member States of the zone must recognize the vital role of diplomacy in fostering the objectives of their organization. They should give whole-hearted, consistent and substantial support to the work of their diplomats both at the State and international levels. The venture on which they have set out is the quintessence of South-South co-operation. Those diplomats — quiet and unobtrusive workers — are the builders of peace and security.

STATEMENT ON THE MAINTENANCE OF REGIONAL PEACE IN AFRICA

by

Mamadou Bah

Director, Political Department of the OAU

By 1945, within the space of three decades, mankind had experienced two world wars which cost millions of lives. Accordingly, when it was founded, in 1945, the United Nations set for itself, as one of its main objectives, the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, the United Nations Security Council was set up and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, it is empowered to take coercive measures, including the use of armed force, in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

It must, however, be emphasized that these measures, in the form contemplated in the Charter, have practically never been applied. Instead, the United Nations has had recourse to peace-keeping operations which have thus become part of United Nations practice. These operations, which have also as their objective the maintenance or restoration of peace and security in a situation of potential or actual conflict, have two essential characteristics:

1. They are not based on the use of armed force.

2. They must necessarily have the agreement or consent of the State or States concerned.

The United Nations peace-keeping forces or "Blue Helmets" have until now been used to perform the following main functions:

(a) To assist in maintaining and restoring law and order in a particular country.

(b) To interpose themselves between belligerents in order to facilitate a peaceful settlement.

(c) To monitor a cease-fire or supervise its observance.

(d) To help a Government to maintain peace in a troubled area of its country.

(e) To bring humanitarian assistance to stricken populations.

To speak of the maintenance of regional peace in the African context would imply *a priori* placing oneself in the United Nations context since, as has just been indicated, it is the world Organization which has the primary and principal responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world. This, however, does not mean that every peace-keeping operation has been undertaken, or must be undertaken, by the United Nations itself. There have in fact been in the past operations of this kind conducted by such international and regional organizations as the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity.

With regard to the maintenance of regional peace in Africa, which is the subject of this statement, I would like to begin by mentioning briefly two peace-keeping operations undertaken in Africa in the past by the United Nations, and then refer to the sole OAU experiment from which we shall be able to draw a number of lessons.

A. The United Nations peace-keeping operations in Egypt and the Congo

The first United Nations force sent to Africa was known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), following the Suez affair. It will be recalled that in 1956 Anglo-French forces carried out an unprovoked invasion of the Suez Canal in Egypt. Fortunately, the international community at the time took a firm stand against the Anglo-French action. Accordingly, taking a firm stand in favour of the maintenance of peace, the United Nations decided, in General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I), adopted in 1956, to send a force to Egypt in order to deal with this new situation. The Egyptian Government, by accepting that resolution, thereby consented to the dispatch of the Emergency Force, whose objective was to secure a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the occupation forces. The United Nations intervention in Egypt was largely instrumental in achieving that objective.

A few years later, in 1960, tragic events occurred in the Congo (the present Zaire) with the Katanga affair. The Central Government of the Congo at that time, led by Patrice Lumumba, appealed to the United Nations, requesting the Organization to intervene to assist it in re-establishing law and order. The appeal by the Congo to the United Nations was contained in the telegram sent on 12 July 1960 by Lumumba and which read: "Military aid requested has as its essential purpose to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present foreign aggression which is a threat to international peace".

For the Congolese Government, the issue was not so much an internal problem (the secession of Katanga) as the protection of the national territory in order to safeguard its integrity. As we know, the situation turned out to be much more complicated than it appeared at first. In any case, as soon as it received the Congolese request, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General, on 13 July 1960, to take the necessary measures in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Accordingly, the United Nations sent to the Congo a peace-keeping force known as the United Nations Civilian Operation in the Congo (ONUC). In accordance with a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1960, its objective was to assist the Central Government of the Congo with a view to preserving the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, to protecting and advancing the welfare of its people and, lastly, to safeguarding international peace.

In view of the complexity of the situation prevailing at that time, due to the existence of two parallel Governments, one legitimate (the Central Government) and another *de facto* (the Government of Katanga), the United Nations made a point of making a pressing appeal to all Congolese to seek a peaceful solution to their problems. That appeal was not heeded by the secessionists of Katanga and events took a tragic turn with the murder of the former Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Thanks, however, to the agreement concluded between the Congo and the United Nations to extend the scope of United Nations action to the whole of Congolese territory, the Blue Helmets were able to penetrate into Katanga and help to bring the secession to an end.

B. The OAU and peace-keeping in Chad

Faced with the deterioration in the political situation in Chad, the OAU has always worked to persuade the different political movements of that country to come to the negotiating table to settle their disputes. Thus, a conference was organized in August 1979 at Lagos with the participation of all the political-military families of Chad. That conference led to the signing of the Lagos Agreement on national reconciliation in Chad. Among other things, the Agreement provided for the establishment of a neutral OAU force in Chad. It was thus that the idea was born of an OAU peace-keeping force for the maintenance of peace and security in Chad.

Accordingly, at its thirty-fourth regular session, held in February 1980, the OAU Council of Ministers approved in resolution 69 (XXXIV) the sending of that force and accepted the principle of its financing by the OAU itself. Since it proved impossible to collect the funds required for establishing the force, the Conference of Heads of States and Government decided at its seventeenth regular session, held in 1980 at Freetown, Sierra Leone, to request Member States which were in a position to do so to send neutral forces of the OAU to Chad, leaving it to the OAU to finance the logistic and operational support from funds obtained by means of voluntary contributions.

In response to the appeal launched by the OAU, the following Member States agreed to supply contingents: Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya and Zaire. Those countries were thus added to the three States selected, in accordance with the aforementioned resolution 769, namely Benin, Congo and Guinea.

Seized of the case by the OAU, the United Nations Security Council met in April 1982 and adopted resolution 504 (1982) in which it supported the initiative of the Organization of African Unity.

The States participating in the force had already met in November 1981 at Nairobi and decided that headquarters would be established and the force deployed in December 1981.

Unfortunately, not all the States which had been approached supplied military contingents. That was the case, for example, of Guinea and Benin.

It must be acknowledged that the peace-keeping operation in Chad, the only one attempted by the OAU as a regional organization, was not a success. Far from it! The case of the OAU, however, is not the only example, that of the United States in Lebanon in 1982/1984 should also be mentioned.

There are many reasons for the OAU's failure, and it is difficult to say which, among the obvious reasons and hidden reasons, weighed more heavily in the balance. One could, however, venture to say that among the most obvious reasons are the following:

1. The inexperience of the OAU in this field

It is a fact that there was no technical provision in the Charter of the OAU in that regard. The operation undertaken for Chad was simply prompted by United Nations examples, but without having the financial or technical resources. In other words, it was much later, after the establishment of the Charter, that the Defence Commission set about trying to organize a task force in the eventuality of a conflict between Member States or between factions within one and the same State. The discussion on the question is still continuing and proposals are often deferred from one session to another without any decisive action.

2. Political differences of all kinds and interference by all and sundry

(a) The role of the Force, although clearly defined, was not perceived in the same way by the Head of State of Chad at the time and by the OAU authorities.

(b) The agreements were broken by various factions, either in bad faith or because of uncontrolled passion.

(c) African and non-African Powers, variously involved in the conflict, threw matters out of kilter and further complicated a situation, which was already extremely complex.

3. Pitiful dearth of financial and logistic resources

(a) The OAU relied on voluntary contributions by its Member States; it was only able to find $400,000 out of a budget estimated at $162,298,500.

(b) The OAU turned to the United Nations. Unfortunately, for obvious political reasons, the OAU wished to retain sponsorship of the operation, whereas the Security Council refused to finance an operation which it did not control.

These are a few of the reasons underlying the failure of the OAU peace-keeping operation in Chad, which nevertheless came within the scope of the aims and objectives of the OAU Charter as well as of the Charter of the United Nations. The OAU, however, in spite of those reasons, did not abdicate and did not withdraw from its rightful role.

It endeavoured, as indeed it does at present, to resolve, by means of consultation, negotiation and conciliation, the disputes which arise between Member States or between factions within one and the same State. This is perhaps the essential phase of all peace-keeping operations.

Beyond that, the Organization maintains today sufficiently close relations of co-operation with the United Nations to enable it, in cases which require powerful means, to resort to the United Nations, of whom its Member States form an integral part.

In a way, this is what we see today in Namibia, although this case is the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations, and what we will perhaps see tomorrow in the case of the Sahara.

It means that the maintenance of peace at the regional level can only be viewed in the overall context of actions for the peace and security of the world.

Peace-keeping operations, whether at the regional or subregional level, therefore presuppose:

1. An approved willingness to negotiate peace and a commitment to take actions for that purpose.
2. The co-operation of all concerned or interested parties.
3. Intelligent preparations and adequate resources (people, equipment and finance).
4. Active co-operation whenever necessary by the United Nations, which is interested in the highest degree in world peace.

Conventional Disarmament and Its Impact on Africa

by

Olu Adeniji

Ambassador of Nigeria to France

The prospect of conventional disarmament holds out great consequences not only for the continent but also for the entire world. The arms race both in its nuclear and conventional aspects has been the single most important element of the destabilizing factors in international relations since 1945. Though initially born out of the ideological division of Europe and the consequent quest for strategic military superiority, it soon developed a technological momentum of its own, becoming more the cause rather than the effect of the distrust in the relationship of the two alliances. The issue of negotiations on conventional weapons was raised side by side with that of nuclear weapons when the United Nations took up the question of disarmament in 1946. Due, however, to the unforeseen and most dangerous advance in nuclear weaponry, the fear engendered shifted all attention at the multilateral level to nuclear weapons.

Except in Europe, where the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks for Central Europe were initiated, conventional disarmament did not attract multilateral attention again until the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978. The Final Document of the special session affirmed that, side by side with negotiations on nuclear weapons, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals, it was stated, had a special responsibility in pursuing conventional armaments reduction. Underscoring the central role of Europe, which has the greatest concentration of conventional weapons, the Final Document postulated that the achievement of a more stable situation at a lower level of military potential would contribute towards the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security.

The increased attention given to conventional weapons at the multilateral level was the result of a broader appreciation of the role of that category of weapons in the security situation not only in Europe (where it has always been considered very important), but also in other regions. The factors that hastened that broader appreciation can be summarized as follows:

(i) the conventional arms race is closely related to the ideological and political rivalries between the East and West. The super-Powers, which are the leaders in the nuclear arms race, are also responsible for propelling the conventional arms race. They and their allies are responsible for all technological innovations in conventional weaponry, whose main focus is the arms race in Europe;

(ii) the increasing sophistication and destructive power of conventional weapons constitutes an ever-growing threat. Unlike nuclear weapons, conventional weapons are easily used, mostly in areas far removed from Europe;

(iii) conventional arms transfer became a major foreign policy tool in the global lateral expansion of the East-West rivalry. It bred dependence. It has therefore contributed in no small measure to the complications of third world national and regional problems, creating instability and insecurity;

(iv) conventional weapons are the drain-pipe of the arms race, consuming 80 per cent of military expenditures;

(v) conventional arms accumulation in the third world has led to regional competition and arms races, some of which are independent of the central arms race;

(vi) conventional arms purchase creates financial burdens on the developing countries, leading to economic difficulties which, in turn, provoke national instabilities; and

(vii) the interlink of conventional and nuclear weapons in the arms race in Europe through the theory of deterrence, whereby nuclear weapons can be used in response to an attack with conventional weapons.

The militarization of Europe, arising out of bipolarization, encouraged militarization of the third world as part of the means of creating spheres of influence for strategic advantage. Nuclear weapons remain the most spectacular aspect of the arms race, as they pose a threat to the very existence of mankind. Nevertheless, the complementary race in conventional weapons has had a more direct and proven impact on the third world. Unlike Europe, which has escaped the outbreak of war and use of the awesome conventional weapons that have been developed by the two alliances, the third world has had to endure the consequences of their use. More than 150 wars have been fought in about 70 countries since 1945, accounting for more than 20 million casualties. Instability in the third world has been further promoted by the requirement of many countries which have been subjected to acts of aggression to embark upon the acquisition of military potentials that they certainly could ill-afford and would have preferred to avoid.

Certainly not all third world or African wars can be attributed to cold war provocation. However, the cold war has been identified as the single constant common factor in these wars, contributing to the prolongation, even if not to the outbreak, of many. Nearly 70 per cent of the wars saw foreign involvement. The extension of the central arms race of the super-Powers found expression in arms supply, which became an instrument of their foreign policy. Arms transfer became a potent means of extending influence and of exerting political pressure. Arms supply became far more than an economic occurrence, or a military relationship; it became, in the words of Andrew Pierre, "foreign policy writ large". Former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania concurred with this observation when he wrote: "The selling of arms is something which a country does when it wants to support and strengthen the régime or group to whom the sale is made..." The interests of the two alliances in pursuit of their strategic interests became intertwined and often take precedence over local conditions. The pattern of arms supply to a given region is always proportional to the competitiveness of the major Powers in the region. This is why 46 per cent of all arms transfer to the third world has been to the Middle East.

Africa's share of 18.4 per cent (excludes transfer to Egypt but includes other North African countries) shows on the one hand by its subregional distribution the weight of great-Power interest in the political evolution of the subregion and on the other a general awareness of the strategic importance of the continent, which could no longer be taken for granted following the independence of African countries. The Horn of Africa was the centre of intense arms supply in the mid-70s with changes in super-Power supplier in keeping with changes in the ideological orientation of the recipient. South Africa has always for strategic considerations by the NATO alliance been favoured in military supplies and transfer of military technology. This accounts for its far superior conventional capability in addition to its nuclear- weapon capability. Major arms supply went to southern Africa generally in the period following the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which, as front-line States, came under intense pressure from the *apartheid* régime in Pretoria. Besides South Africa's open aggression, ideological considerations led to United States military supply to insurgents in Angola and Mozambique. This forced Angola and Mozambique towards large arms imports (from the Soviet Union), making the two countries combined next only to Libya in the volume of their arms import in the period 1975-85. West Africa, which, by and large, has not experienced great-Power ideological rivalry nor intense regional arms competition, has not witnessed a big jump, except in the period of the military "modernization programmes" of the late 70s and early 80s. In northern Africa, the source of arms supply has also followed ideological lines and reflects subregional competition, as well as concern for the situation in the Middle East to such an extent that three countries, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, accounted for more than half of Africa's arms imports in the period 1971-85. (For details see Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson: *Arms Transfer to the Third World 1971-1985.)*

Africa's share of world military expenditure never represented a high figure – at 1.5 per cent at the highest and only 6.5 per cent of the expenditure of the third world. These statistics however do not provide the whole picture. Africa's percentage of foreign arms purchase was particularly high since the continent hardly produced weapons. In 1959 Africa accounted for only 3 per cent of third world arms purchases; by 1978 it accounted for 25 per cent. Arms import as a percentage of total imports rose from 1.3 per cent in 1969 to 9.3 per cent in 1978. Thus Africa had its share of the arms sales explosion of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. The relationship between arms purchases and resource availability as distinct from actual security requirements by third world countries is shown by the following statistics. The value of arms sales to the third world in the 1970s rose to the gigantic sum of $286 billion, four times the value in the previous two decades. That figure, it may be observed, is much higher than Africa's current crushing foreign debt burden of 218 billion dollars and is about 26 per cent of current total third world debt, which is threatening not only the economic but also the political viability of the debtor countries. (See Brzoska and T. Ohlson *op. cit.*)

The economic consequences for Africa of the massive acquisition of arms in the decade between the 1970s and the early years of the 1980s are vividly demonstrated in part by the current debt crisis. Of total Africa's debt of 218 billion dollars as at 1988, the arms purchase component is estimated at about 20 per cent to 25 per cent. The unproductive nature of arms purchase means that the continent has derived no returns from this vast outlay. Unlike other developing parts of the world in Asia and Latin America, Africa has not even derived the benefit of a transfer of technology. In the past few years, some developing countries, taking advantage of the technological expertise acquired from arms transfer, have emerged as competitors in the arms sales market. These have however been mainly from the newly industrializing States of Asia and Latin America. With the exception of course of South Africa, which has had all the advantages of collaboration in the development of its arms industry and with the possible exception of Egypt, no African country features among serious arms producers.

How closely linked to the maintenance of the security of those African countries outside southern Africa (especially Angola and Mozambique) that imported large quantities of arms in the period of arms trade explosion can be seen from the sudden drastic drop in arms import in the current period of economic difficulties. Obviously lack of resources to expend on arms procurement has encouraged the orientation towards maintaining security at a low level of arms acquisition. Regional security from the standpoint of intra-African relations is likely to benefit further as greater attention will be paid to peaceful resolution of disputes, particularly border problems, even without formal conventional disarmament arrangements in the region.

It is of course necessary to take account of the international environment to which Africa and other third world countries has had to adjust. The prevailing security concept lays priority on military preparedness as the guarantee of national security. Alliance structure, which dominated global strategic planning, promoted especially in countries outside the protective umbrella of the two alliances the fear of insecurity. The super-Powers fed this fear by undertaking to help such countries defend their security against both internal subversion and external aggression. In the absence of an international system that guarantees general security, small States will always have the urge to protect themselves as best as they can. State military power is the obvious first resort. The experience of Africa with colonial wars, with post-independence destabilization, with racist domination and the struggle against *apartheid* further increased the pressure on the boosting of State military power.

A basic principle underlying disarmament negotiations is that they should be carried out in a balanced manner based on the undiminished security of all parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. Undiminished security implies a certain asymmetry in disarmament whereby States with the large arsenals will make greater sacrifices.

Whatever may be the *de facto* regional situation, Africa as an integral part of the international community cannot take steps out of tune with the rest of the world. Though possibilities exist for regional initiative, disarmament in Africa can only have full meaning and effect as part of the global process. Conventional disarmament, to have global effect, needs to be addressed globally with major steps taken in Europe, the centre of the arms race. The beginning of the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in March 1989 marked a turning-point in that, for the first time, the issue of conventional disarmament in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was being addressed.

The effect of successful negotiations and consequent conventional disarmament by the major military alliances will be of significance for Africa as well as other parts of the world. It will encourage initiatives in other regions, taking account of peculiarities of each region. It should also signal, in the context of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, a major step in the restoration of mutual trust and peaceful co-existence between the opposing military alliances. This will introduce a more objective consideration of third world issues. Since African and other third world regional problems are complicated by ideological meddling, solution should become easier by the scaling down and removal of such interference. The southern Africa situation as well as the Middle East problem, both of which affect African countries intimately, may be the beneficiary of the more relaxed approach to international situations which should follow disarmament.

Conventional disarmament will entail a greater rationalization of arms transfer as well as vast reduction in the necessity for arms acquisition. For Africa, however, it may also pose the dilemma of how to acquire the military hardware essential for the protection of sovereignty even at the lowest military level. Current total dependence of African countries on imported arms must be seen as a problem which should begin to be seriously addressed. The emergence of third world arms suppliers should provide no comfort. Dependence on and transfer of foreign exchange to arms suppliers is unacceptable, whether these involve the traditional arms suppliers in the developed countries or the new producers in the third world. Considering the huge investment required, co-operation among African countries is essential. It is high time we started.

The interrelationship between disarmament and development has come to be recognized and is progressively being given the attention it deserves. Development, global as well as national, cannot fulfil its potential in a situation where vast resources are devoted to the arms race. As was aptly stated in the Final Document of the International Conference on Disarmament and Development, held in 1978, "Underdevelopment and declining prospects for development as well as mismanagement and waste of resources constitute challenges to security .... The world can hardly be regarded as secure so long as there is polarisation of wealth and poverty at the national and international levels".

The current annual military expenditure of more than 1,000 billion dollars is in stark contrast to the paltry sum made available for international economic co-operation. The global arms race and development compete for the same finite resources; unfortunately the arms race invariably wins the competition. The use of resources for military purposes very often amounts to a reduction of resources for civilian sectors. Disarmament therefore will be beneficial to African efforts in several ways. It will reduce pressure on African governments to devote too great resources to the military sector and thereby free those resources for economic and social development. Disarmament will stimulate the global economy through, *inter alia,* the conversion of military industries to civilian sectors. This would in turn have not only domestic but international benefit. Developed countries that will be the primary beneficiary of the release of huge sum from the military to civilian sector will have greater self-interest in promoting the economic well-being of the developing countries. Africa, which has seen its economy decline sharply in the last decade, will benefit from increased co-operation. Experience has shown that because of the dependent nature of African economies, an unstable international economic environment negates the results of African efforts at domestic economic reforms. The much needed resources accruing from remunerative returns on their products as well as from foreign investment have been sadly lacking. For reasons that can be partly attributed to the current arms race, the distortions in the international economic and financial systems make many African countries net exporters of capital, thus contributing to the constant decline in living standards, which have fallen as much as 20 per cent in Africa since 1981. Growth and development will be facilitated by disarmament.

CLOSING REMARKS
by
Mamman Anka
Honourable Minister of State
Ministry of External Affairs
Lagos, Nigeria

It is a great honour and privilege for me to address you at this final session of the United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Africa.

No question is more important, no agenda more relevant than the security and survival of the individual, the State and, in the final analysis, the international community itself. It is based on this fundamental understanding that over time, the best human resources, creative minds and energies have been channelled towards the debate on how to ensure survival and security. In various United Nations and other multilateral fora the concern for the right to life and the preservation of life is paramount. At the various meetings where disarmament, human rights, economic subjects, social and cultural issues are examined and debated, it is the same questions that are recurrently debated namely,

- how shall we increase security?
- how shall we preserve life?
- how best should we manage conflicts?
- how best can we reduce the risks and the likelihood of war?

These are fundamental questions. In addition to finding answers to these questions, the specific objective of this and other workshops is to provide assistance to the Governments of the region who are concerned with arms limitation and disarmament measures as well as ways to promote a better understanding and awareness in the regions of international and regional machinery for disarmament and regional security. The objective also includes the deepening of the understanding on disarmament matters among countries in the African region, thereby enhancing the prospects for peace and security not only in Africa but also in the world as a whole.

In the past five days the workshop has exhaustively examined many complex questions, such as, the security perceptions and requirements in Africa; regional systems for security promotion and conflict resolution; a nuclear-free zone in Africa; disarmament and security; disarmament and development; security in the Indian Ocean; peace keeping in Africa; multilateral systems for the promotion of security and disarmament; concrete aspects of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, among many others. The level and quality of the presentations have been high indeed, and the follow-up discussions have in no small measure enhanced our understanding of these complex questions.

The Nigerian Government has been keenly attentive to the discussions, flow of ideas and recommendations that have emerged or that have been reemphasized in the past few days. The Government has monitored and noted with satisfaction the fertile generation of ideas, the commitment of the participants to the workshop and recommendations for peace and security in Africa.

The discussions on the relationship between disarmament, security and development were most valuable, productive and rewarding. The detailed analysis clearly demonstrated the relationship between these three concepts. It is the position of the Nigerian Government that disarmament and various forms of arms control clearly enhance security, since they reduce the likelihood of war. However, it should be recognized, as you have so ably determined in your deliberations, that there are also non-military aspects of the security of States. It is in this connection, therefore, that the workshop remarkably recognized the correlation between disarmament and development. Progress in disarmament clearly releases resources for development. Evidence was adduced in the course of the workshop to show that of Africa's total external debt burden of $US 230 billion, 20 per cent of the debt is related to arms expenditure. For the avoidance of doubt, however, it ought to be stated in clear and unmistakable terms that our understanding of progress in disarmament, such as the commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, does *not preclude* technological research for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In the course of the workshop, many other worthy solutions were proposed for enhancing peace and security in Africa. It was suggested that the security function of the Organization of African Unity could be expanded; the need to examine the possibility of establishing an African security council to preview, cope with and resolve threats to regional security was considered; the view was emphasized that an African peace-keeping mechanism should be structured and institutionalized, notwithstanding the Organization's financial constraints.

The workshop noted that a frequent cause of crisis and insecurity between States was distrust and suspicion. We must overcome the propensity to fight rather than to negotiate the resolution of inter-State disputes. We must become wholly committed to the principle of non-recourse to violence in the settlement of disputes. Rational consideration of our socio-economic conditions in Africa clearly shows that the immediate threats to continental security are hunger, the declining quality of life, the decline in individual aspirations for the future and, consequently, the onset of panic, fear and desperation. A sense of hopelessness and alienation is setting in amongst our peoples in Africa. Therefore, we must prudently allocate our resources more in the direction of food and economic security.

We must not forget a recent and important lesson of history. It was, we remember, the economic crisis and depression in Europe in the 1930s which led to the rise of Nazism and consequently to the catastrophe of World War II.

On our part, the Government of Nigeria will remain steadfastly committed to fostering continental peace and security. We shall continue to support both the subregional and regional organizations – ECOWAS and the OAU – in efforts to achieve our security objectives.

In conclusion, let me, on behalf of the Honourable Minister of External Affairs, congratulate most sincerely the participants at this workshop for their valuable contributions to the search for greater peace and security in Africa. I would also like to pay great tribute to the role of the United Nations as the premier international organization for the promotion of international peace and security. In particular, I would like to pay special tribute to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for its energetic efforts in the preparation and co-sponsorship of this conference with the Federal Government of Nigeria.

I wish to express my profound appreciation also to the workshop Secretariat, organizers, and members of the support services.

I wish to address immense and special thanks to translators and interpreters for their important but very tedious work of facilitating communication amongst us. They deserve our applause.

Last but not least, I also congratulate the members of the Ministry of External Affairs for the personal sacrifices they have made and their demonstrated commitment to ensure the success of this workshop.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS

BENIN

Mr. Timothe Adanlin
Chief
International Organization Service
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cotonou, Benin

BURUNDI

Mr. Joseph Gahungu
Adviser to the Director of
International Organizations Department
Ministry of External Affairs
Bujumbura, Burundi

CAMEROON

Mr. Eyambe William
Second Counsellor
Delegation of Cameroon
Geneva, Switzerland

COTE D'IVOIRE

Mr. Irie-Bi-Jacques
Secrétaire Adjoint
Service de la Direction des Nations Unies
et des Organisations Internationales
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire

EGYPT

Mr. Khaled Sarwat
Attache
International Organizations Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cairo, Egypt

GABON

Mr. Jean-Pierre Sole-Emane
Chef de la Division des Nations Unies
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération
BP - 2245
Libreville, Gabon

GAMBIA

Mr. William Joof
First Secretary
Embassy of Gambia
Lagos, Nigeria

GHANA

Mr. Kojo Yeboah-Asuamah
Deputy Director
International Organizations and Conferences Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Accra, Ghana

KENYA

Mrs. Rosemary Ndegwa
Assistant Secretary
Department of International Organizations and Conferences
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nairobi, Kenya

LIBERIA

Ms. Joyce Nuefville
Desk Officer
Bureau of International Organization
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Monrovia, Liberia

MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Inocencio Dinis
Second Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department of International Organizations
Maputo, Mozambique

NIGER

Mr. Abdoulaye Moumouni
Counselor
Permanent Mission of Niger to the United Nations
417 East 50th Street
New York, New York 10022 USA

NIGERIA

Mr. T. Adelanwa
Third Secretary
Ministry of External Affairs
Lagos, Nigeria

SENEGAL

Mr. Fode Seck
Director of International Organizations Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dakar, Senegal

SIERRA LEONE

Mr. Abdul Rahman Wurie
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Freetown, Sierra Leone

TANZANIA

Mrs. Radhia N. Msuya
Second Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania

TOGO

Ms. Essie Agbehonou
Studies Officer
Direction of International Organization
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lome, Togo

UGANDA

Mr. Kamurasi Kapirisa
Senior Assistant Secretary
International Organization Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kampala, Uganda

ZAIRE

Mr. Kibidi Ngovuka
Ministre Conseiller
Permament Mission of Zaire to the United Nations
767 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017 USA

ZAMBIA

Mr. Kabuku Wamulwang
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lusaka, Zambia

ZIMBABWE

Mr. Peter Hobwani
Senior Political Officer
International Organizations Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Harare, Zimbabwe

List of Observers

Major O.O. Akinyode
Strategic Support Group
Nigerian Army Intelligence

Captain D. Etea
Ministry of Defence

Lt. Col. S.E. Fagbemi
NIPSS - KURU

Mr. O. Idowu
Strategic Support Group

T.S.O. Olumoko
SADG I

Lt. Col. S. K. Oni
Defence Industries Corporation
Kaduna

Mr. O.B. Oshodi
Ministry of Defence

Ambassador Svein O. Saether
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oslo, Norway

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